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"I think there is a world market for maybe five computers."'
- Thomas Watson, Chairman of IBM, 1943.
"We are on the verge of a revolution that is just as profound as the
change in the economy that came with the industrial revolution. Soon
electronic networks will allow people to transcend the barriers of time
and distance and take advantage of global markets and business opportunities not even imaginable today, opening up a new world of economic
2
possibility and progress."
- Albert Gore, Vice President of the United States, 1997.

t Judicial Clerk, Illinois Appellate Court. Notary Public, State of Illinois. B.S., Illinois State University; J.D., The John Marshall Law School.
tt Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Notary Public, State of Illinois.
B.S., M.A., Bradley University; J.D., University of Illinois.
1. Margaret M. Newton, Random Notes Redux, 31 ARK. LAw. 6 (1996).
2. White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, July 1, 1997, 507 PLIY
PAT,

at 147, 179 (visited June 20, 1998) <http//www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm/>.
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INTRODUCTION

What a difference 50 years can make! In light of advances in technology multiplying at geometric rates in less and less time, the monstrous first computers of the 1940s seem like Stonehenge era devices in
comparison to today's computing achievements. What Chairman Watson did not accurately foresee, was the extent of commercial applications
of the new technology. We expect that Vice-President Gore's predictions
will come true-and in far less than another 50 years.
Imagine that Carroll is a diamond broker in Chicago and commonly
receives phone orders to ship diamonds to Jean, a buyer in Paris. One
Friday, Carroll receives an e-mail purportedly from Jean, directing Carroll to send a quantity of diamonds overnight but this time to a different
address in London. It is too late to contact anyone by phone to verify this
change. How can Carroll change the shipping destination while remaining confident that the e-mail came from the trusted buyer Jean? 3
Through the use of an electronic instrument digitally executed and verified by a certification authority or cybernotary. 4 Assume that a frequent
gambler Pat decides to engage in on-line gaming through a Pacific Island
casino corporation. How can the casino be confident that Pat is not an
impostor? How can Pat be confident that any winnings will really be
paid to Pat?5 Through the use of an electronic instrument digitally executed and verified by a certification authority. If the President of the
United States and the representative of a foreign government, such as
the Prime Minister of Ireland, wanted to execute a diplomatic instrument almost simultaneously in separate ceremonies in their home countries without the two heads of state having to meet face-to-face, how
could that process be securely accomplished? 6 By way of a digitally
signed and properly verified electronic document. Goods are now being
3. Falsification of an e-mail .sender's identity is a growing problem. See generally
Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(enjoining defendants from sending "spam" e-mail messages with falsified return
addresses).
4. See Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Notaries Public-Lost in Cyberspace,
or Key Business Professionals of the Future?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L.
703, 737-41 (1997) (discussing the role of the certification authority, and identifying the
nickname or synonym of "cybernotary); James Hill, Lock and Load: Document Security on
the Internet, Bus. LAw TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 8 (addressing security issues in electronic
commerce, including digital signatures and certification authorities).
5. See generally Anthony Cabot & Joseph Kelly, Internet, Casinos and Money Laundering, 2 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING 134 (1998) (noting the establishment and expansion of
on-line gaming).
6. Richard P. Klau, ContractNegotiations Enter a New Dimension When PartiesCan
Sign On the Electronic Dotted Line, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1998, at 14, 16 ("In September
[1998], President Clinton and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern signed a U.S.-Ireland
communique on e-commerce using digital signatures.").
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bought and sold on the Internet; international high-stakes gaming is
presently being lawfully conducted on the Internet; and the U.S. President and Irish Prime Minister have already signed a diplomatic accord
on the Internet. 7 The possible applications of the technology to government and business seem endless and imperative.
The attraction of commercial trade to the Internet is likened to a
modern day gold rush, as business owners and speculators clamor to
stake their claims over a cyberspace territory, seeking fortunes with
computerized shovels and pans.8 Like the gold rushes of the 1800s, we
have seen business-to-business Internet transactions rise from nonexistence a few years ago to $15 billion in 1998, and an expected $175
billion by 2000. 9 One cannot pick up a newspaper without reading about
the Internet, or turn on a television or radio without hearing about the
Internet. Whether or not we have personal access to the Internet, it has
unquestionably affected virtually every facet of our economy and our
lives.' 0 This includes effects on business practices and legal policy."
7. Regarding the September 1998 digital signing of the U.S.-Ireland communique on
e-commerce, "It is believed to be the first time two heads of government have used the
technology to sign a joint document, but it certainly won't be the last." Id. at 16.
8. Craig W. Harding, Selected Issues In Electronic Commerce: New Technologies and
Legal Paradigms,491 PLI/PAT, at 7, 9 (1997). The Internet was originally envisioned by
the United States Government as a tool for communicating during a nuclear event. HARLEY HAHN, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 2 (1996). Eventually, the Internet evolved
into a collection of tens of thousands of computer networks, stretching across the globe. Id.
at 3. For a good general discussion of the Internet and its background, uses and characteristics, the case of A.C.L.U. v. Reno, is a good example. See A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 830-49 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
9. American Software Unveils Internet Strategy: New Products To Take Advantage of
$175M Market While Substantially Increasing Corporate Efficiencies, PR NEWSWIRE, August 13, 1998, at 12:00:00. The Internet has experienced extraordinary growth, increasing
from less than 300 computers in 1981 to nearly 10,000,000 host computers (sixty percent or
which are in the United States) in 1996, not including the personal computers used to
access the Internet. See A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830. By 1999, an estimated 200
million people will have regular access to the Internet. Id. Of course, estimates do vary
somewhat. Another report said "busines-to-business purchases [online], such as the
wholesale purchase of supplies, could reach $300 billion by 2002 .... ". Internet Traffic
Booming, DAILY SOUTHTOWN [API, April 4, 1998, at 1.
10. During the 1998 World Cup soccer competition, computer manufacturer HewlettPackard supported the games by maintaining an official Web site, providing scores and
other information. See Sponsors Going For Gold Rivals Vie to Replace IBM in Olympics,
THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, August 8, 1998, at Cll, available in 1998 WL 7789577. The site
received over 1.5 billion visits in a mere five weeks. Id.
11. "We expect rapid, fundamental shifts in commerce as digital technology sweeps the
globe." Richard D. Marks, Subject: Information Technology, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 36; see
also Bus. WIRE, Sept. 16, 1998, 13:05:00 (discussing the liberalization of the U.S. government's policy on exporting encryption technology); Internet Policies Not Disclosed, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1998, at A55, availablein 1998 WL 2672555 (stating that many companies on
the Internet are not following the U.S. government's privacy guidelines, and such avoid-
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Small businesses that use the Internet commonly have average revenues of over a million dollars more than those that do not. 1 2 The Internet not only increases potential small business revenues, but it also
supplies a shot in the arm to large businesses and the economy as a
whole. 13 One study indicates that the Internet will provide a boost to the
economy of $124 billion this year, and over half a trillion dollars in
2002.14 By 2002, American businesses will spend more than $200 billion
dollars on Internet-technology deployment, or one-fifth of America's total
spending on technology. 15 The establishment of the first fully on-line
law school has even recently been announced. 16 Realistically, it is impossible to determine the future of the Internet and its impact at any
given moment. 17 One thing is abundantly clear-that the Internet's
profit potential has indeed started the gold rush of our time. Unfortunately, there also exists modern day claim jumpers, cheats and bandits,
and they are very good at what they do.
A novel but serious illustration of the vulnerability of the security of
electronic communications occurred in October of 1998, when millions of
America Online ("AOL") e-mail messages were disrupted by an impostor
ance may prompt congressional action); Alan Pearce, Regulating the Net, AM. NETWORK,
Mar. 15, 1998, at 14, available in 1998 WL 15870849 (discussing political and policy issues
regarding enhanced applications of the Internet); Walter Hamilton & Thomas S. Mulligan,
SEC Cracks Down on Internet Stock Fraud Securities:Agency Brings ChargesAgainst 44
People and Companies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at C1, available in 1998 WL 18887991
(discussing the pervasive problem of illegally promoting stocks over the Internet).
12. Key Facts On the Internet, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, August 1, 1998, at 22, available
in 1998 WL 8096129. Of the small businesses with Internet access, the average revenue is
$3.79 million, compared to $2.72 million for those not using the Internet. Id.
13. Computer supplier Dell takes in $4 million dollars per day from its Internet transactions. See BT: Companies Under Utilizing [sic] Technology, M2 PRESSWIRE, August 10,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16516785.
14. Olson, S., Mining the Online Economy: Electronic Commerce Software, VOLPE
WELTY & Co., January 10, 1997, at 3.
15. Id.
16. See William M. Bulkeley, Kaplan Plans A Law School Via the Web, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 1998, at B1,available in 1998 WL-WSJ 18984587 (describing Kaplan Education
Center's plan to form Concord University School of Law, offering on-line classes in December of 1998); Kaplan Opens On-Line: Only Law School Based in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1998, at D2, available in 1998 WL 18874435. Graduate law degrees are also being introduced over the Internet. See First On-line Degree Approved by the ABA, NAT'L JURIST, Oct.
1998, at 12 (reporting the approval of an on-line LL.M. degree in International Taxation, at
Regent University School of Law); David Rubiales, Distance Learning and the Virtual
Classroom: Faculty Learns New Tricks, FOOTNOTES [AAUP], Fall 1998, at 7 ("The past decade has witnessed the widespread development of distance learning courses .
whether
offered via television or online . .

").

17. A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. Not only is it impossible for a single person
to completely understand the Internet as a whole, but it is impossible for a single person to
understand most of it. Hill, supra note 4, at 2.
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who forged an electronic document.' 8 The impostor succeeded in directing the company, which maintains the electronic address book for
AOL and many other Internet entities, to change AOL's internet address. 19 Apparently, AOL simply had not employed a sufficient level of
security to protect against this impostor's vandalism. 20 The disruption
lasted for more than six hours and affected some 4-5 million e-mail
messages. 2 1 This security breach was especially troublesome in light of
the fact that AOL "controls by far the largest pool of online consumers"
and, therefore, occupies the "position [ofi dominant Internet gateway for
consumers."22 The WALL STREET JOURNAL correctly observed that this
23
"incident served as a dramatic new reminder of security risks online."
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") estimates that the Internet is involved in some eighty percent of all computer crime. 24 The
authors predict that percentage will grow dramatically. Considering the
widespread and escalating use of the Internet and the transactions it
handles that is scary news. As one possible example, ask whether drug
dealers and other racketeers might seek to launder the large sums of
money they acquire (usually in small denominations) through gaming
with on-line casinos. 25 Gaming observers have recently predicted:
"Money laundering, casinos and the Internet may become unavoidably
intertwined in the next decade." 2 6 The extensive Native American gaming enterprises in the United States may be drawn into this mix. 2 7 As
18. See Thomas E. Weber, E-Mail Sent to AOL Users Victim to Attack on Internet's
Address Book, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1998, at B10 (detailing the October 16, 1998, disruption
of millions of AOL messages for several hours); see Sara Nathan, AOL Computer Service
Fixes Problem After Forged Message Tangles E-mail, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 1998, at 7A (reporting that the AOL disruption lasted over six hours and affected between 4.2 and 5.2
million messages).
19. Weber, supra note 18, at B10.
20. Nathan, supra note 18, at 7A.
21. Id.
22. Thomas E. Weber, AOL Net Soars to $68 Million; Beats Forecasts,WALL ST. J., Oct.
28, 1998, at A3.
23. Weber, supra note 18, at B10. The authors would hasten to observe that we doubt
the incident will have much of a financial effect on AOL since it recorded a highly successful tripling of the company's net income for the first fiscal quarter ending September 30,
1998, over the same 1997 period-from $19.2 million in the first quarter of 1997 to $68
million in the first quarter of 1998. See Weber, supra note 22, at A3. We suspect that AOL
officials were eager to release this data soon after the security breach episode. That incident occurred on October 16, 1998. See Weber, supra note 18, at B10. The first quarter
financial data was released on October 27, 1998. See Weber, supra note 22, at A7.
24.

DAVID ICOVE, ET AL., COMPUTER CRIME: A CRIMEFIGHTER'S HANDBOOK 129 (1995).

25. See generally Cabot & Kelly, supra note 5, at 134 (discussing the ways in which
money can be laundered through on-line gaming).
26. Id. at 134.
27. Id. at 138-39. "Native American gambling interests have also indicated interest in
establishing Internet gambling." Id. at 139.
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another possible example, if a thief were able to break into a bank's computer system and steal $1 million, actual total losses could readily exceed
$100 million due to network downtime, application of expensive auditing
procedures, and insurance premium increases, not to mention losses resulting from negative publicity and fleeing depositors. 28 Incidents of Internet fraud are no longer isolated, and many companies are taking steps
to try to avoid such situations. 29 A survey conducted on behalf of the
FBI estimated computer security losses of $100 million in 1996.30 Internet fraud has become such a problem that the United States Senate
Subcommittee on Investigations held hearings on the matter. 3 1 An expected conclusion to be drawn from those hearings was that "[als the
Internet emerges as an important medium of commerce, it poses new
risks .. . of fraud." 32 Among the many Internet security issues facing
lawmakers, a partial solution that has come to the forefront is the use of
33
digital signatures to authenticate documents.
Described in more detail later, digital signatures that are verified by
certification authorities through a system of key pair encryption technology provide a means for the recipients of electronic documents to verify
the senders' identity and to confirm that the documents have not been
altered. 34 Simply stated, a digital signature is a unique combination of
letters and numbers generated by a mathematical algorithm, used to en28. VeriSign Introduces Digital CertificateSolution to Secure EnterpriseServers: Organizations Benefit from Centralized Issuance and Control with VeriSign OnSite for Secure
Server IDs, PR NEWSWIRE, June 3, 1998, 08:21:00.
29. Reports of Internet fraud tripled between 1996 and 1997. David Hayes, Internet
Fraud: Oh, What A Tangled Web! The Number of Complaints About Computer Crooks Is
Rising Sharply, YORK DAILY REC., Mar. 2, 1998, at D6, available in 1998 WL 6211361.
Last year, companies spent roughly $6.3 billion on computer network security systems, a
figure that is expected to double by 2000. See L.A. Lorek, Security the Focus for Businesses
as Internet Crime Increases, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 20, 1997, at 23, available in
1997 WL 11913906.
30. Lorek, supra note 29, at 23. The FBI estimates that less than fifty percent of all
computer system break-ins are reported. Id.
31. Susan Collins, Senate Subcommittee To Hold Hearings On Fraud On the Internet,
GOv'T PRESS RELEASES, Feb. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7321509.
32. Id. See also Hill, supra note 4, at 8 (observing that "as the amount of electronic
commerce increases over the next few years, the amount of fraud is likely to escalate unless
security measures keep pace"). In a situation more apt for a movie, hackers broke into the
Internet site Yahoo, demanding release of an imprisoned computer hacker and threatening
to unleash a devastating virus on December 25, 1998. Yahoo's hacked Web site read "The
virus can be stopped. But not by mortals." Hackers Leave Ransom Note on Yahoo Site,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, at D2, available in 1997 WL 14008548.
33. See Hill, supra note 4, at 10 (opining that "[d]igital signatures have proven secure
after more than a decade of scientific review . . ").
34. Everything You Always Wanted to Know About DigitalSignatures,AusTL. Bus. INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 18182378.
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crypt an electronic document through the use of a "private key."35 A certification authority establishes a repository of clients and issues both
public keys and unique private keys to each. 3 6 A certification authority
can then determine that an electronic document has been sent by a client-sender (rather than having been sent by an impostor) and that the
electronic message is genuine (rather than having been tampered with),
and then can issue a certificate to such effect. 37 The certification authority also assures transmittal of the document to the true client-recipient. 38 Using the same process, a responsive message can be sent.
Because one of the certification authority's principle duties is to
identify a document's singer, many commentators have, perhaps improperly, nicknamed the certification authority as a "cybernotary."3 9 Indeed,
oversight of the "cybernotary" is even statutorily reposed in the same
state agencies that oversee the office of notary public. 40 However, this
comparison to the similar but distinctly separate office of the notary public may be misplaced.
This essay addresses the use of digital signature technology and the
certification authority, and poses the fundamental question of whether
the traditional notary public should really serve as the model for the new
position of certification authority. This paper begins with an historical
review of the concern about document security and the measures taken
to deal with those concerns. Second, the paper includes a very brief overview of the technological aspects of the digital signature and its value in
the global marketplace. Next, this essay examines the similarities between the traditional notary and the certification authority, including
the functions and responsibilities of each. We will also review the sub35. MARcus GONCALVES, FIREWALLS COMPLETE 611 (1998). A "private key" is one that
"belongs to a principal and is never revealed to anyone.., and is used to encrypt a message
digest [or hash function] sent by the principal to anyone else." Id.
36. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 (Supp. 1997).
37. See Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 732-738 (discussing the electronic document security process). "The hope and expectation is that computer technology will improve
and even assure the security of on-line transactions." Id. at 732. "[A] digital signature
transmission that uses the cryptographic methodology is considered 'some of the most secure communication possible'." Id. at 738.
38. See Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 734-737 (explaining the process of matching the sender and recipient in the electronic verification process).
39. See, e.g., Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 704-714 (referring to "cybernotarizations" and "cybernotaries"); Closen & Richards, infra note 195, at A19 (referring to
"cybernotaries").
40. See Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 719 (noting that the state agency that
oversees and regulates notaries is typically the secretary of state's office). In Florida, the
Executive Office of the Governor is the agency to oversee both notaries and certification
authorities. See also Legislative Review, NOTARY BULL., Feb. 1999, at 6 (pointing out legislation in Colorado provides for appointment of notaries by the Secretary of State and "permits Secretary of State to develop rules for digital signatures").
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stantial differences between the two and the potential problems that
may be caused in part by assuming the notary public and certification
authority have an analogous relationship. Then, the essay suggests that
lawmakers more carefully guard the office of certification authority to
ensure it is held as a position of respect to help assure cybernotarized
documents will be accepted both domestically and internationally. This
essay concludes that certification authorities should hold a distinct, vital,
and respected position, with a heightened duty of care owed to subscribers to adequately ensure the continued growth of secure electronic
commerce.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historically, the possibilities that memories would fail or parties
would die, that fraud would be perpetrated, and that evidence would be
lost encouraged parties to take steps to document transactions in an attempt to establish their genuineness. Since the earliest days of written
language and recorded history, efforts to authenticate transactions have
been undertaken, with varying degrees of success. The ancient Chinese,
Greeks, and Romans reduced transactions to written form, and the use of
secret codes were first employed to heighten the security of communications by at least the Third Century B.C. 4 1 "The ancient Assyrians and
Chinese utilized the first recorded fingerprints in conjunction with the
signing of legal documents..
,,42 The Babylonians placed documents in
writing on clay tablets and impressed their fingerprints into the clay as a
way of verifying those writings.4 3 Illiteracy was so pervasive that docu44
ments were often authenticated with seals rather than signatures.
Documents-particularly multiple-page instruments-were bound together with ribbon or cord over which molten wax was poured and into
which a seal from a signet ring or stamp of a family coat of arms was
41. See Hill, supra note 4, at 8 ("The use of secret codes for safeguarding important
information dates back at least to the third century B.C. during the reign of Alexander the
Great."). The question of what constitutes a writing for document integrity purposes continues to be an issue as various kinds of modern technologies create their own unique forms
of documents. See, e.g., McMillan Ltd. v. Warrior Industries, 512 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1986)
(mailgram as a writing); Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 113, 7 U.C.C.
Rep.2d 1380 (N.Y. 1989) (fax as a writing); Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F.
Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (telex as a writing); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp.
1212 (D. Colo. 1972) (tape recording as a writing). But see Roos v. Aloi, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637
(Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that a tape recording is not a writing); Georgia Dept. of Transportation v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a fax is not a writing).
42. Vincent J. Gnoffo, RequiringA Thumbprint for Notarized Transactions:The Battle
Against Document Fraud, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 803, 806 (1998).
43. Id.
44. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 94, Topic 3 (1981).

1999]

DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION

impressed for identification and authentication purposes. 4 5 If the seal
was disturbed, the possibility of tampering was evident. 46 The English
Parliament in 1677 enacted the Statute of Frauds, which mandated that
certain kinds of contracts must be supported by written evidence in order
to obtain legal enforcement. 4 7 Beginning in very early times, parties to
written instruments have often employed the services of witnesses to attest to the identity of document signers and to the validity of their signatures.48 In modern times, some document signing ceremonies have been
filmed or videotaped as an additional security measure. 49 We are presently in the early stage of development of various forms of biometric ver50
ification of the identity of parties to transactions.
45. Michael L. Closen & G. Grant Dixon, Notaries Public from the Time of the Roman
Empire to the United States Today and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. REV. 873, 875 & n.15 (1992);
CLE Liaison Committee, NOTARIES PUBLIC: A HISTORY AND UNOFFICIAL GUIDE, 43 R.I. B.J.,

Nov. 1994, at 13; Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 714 n.66. See also Hill, supra note 4,
at 10 (pointing out that while the Statute of Frauds requires a signature, it "does not,
however, consider a transaction invalid without a signature, but merely unenforceable in
court.").
46. RAYMOND C. ROTHMAN, NOTARY PUBLIC PRACTICES AND GLOSSARY 1 (1978).
47. The original Statute of Frauds was '[an act for the prevention of frauds and perjuries." 29 Car. II c. 3 (1677).
48. Of course, this practice has been incorporated into, and made mandatory by, a wide
variety of statutes. For example, in the estate planning field, statutes regularly require
witnesses to wills, living wills, and/or powers of attorney. See also Record Witnesses in
Journal Entry, NOTARY BULL., Feb. 1999, at 15.
A variety of circumstances may require witnesses ... the mark of an illiterate or
disabled signer typically requires the presence of two witnesses in addition to the
Notary. Recordable real estate documents in many states require the signature of
one or two witnesses to the document's execution, in addition to the Notary.
Id.
49. See Emily Berendt & Laura Lynn Michaels, Your HIV Positive Client: Easing The
Burden On The Family Through Estate Planning,24 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 509, 519 (1991)
(advising that the execution ceremony of a will be videotaped under certain circumstances).
However, the use of video is not always appropriate or legitimate. See Kevin Johnson &
Gary Fields, Jewell Investigation Unmasks FBI 'Tricks,' USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1996, at 13A,
available in 1996 WL 2075026 (stating that the FBI attempted to trick Olympic bombing
suspect Richard Jewel into signing a document that waived his rights to an attorney. FBI
agents reportedly asked Jewel to sign the document in order to make his videotaped interrogation "appear more authentic"). Moreover, because videotaping can be very revealing, it
could actually unmask the incompetence of a document signer or diminish the signer's
credibility. In the recent case of President Clinton's testimony to the Starr grand jury,
some observers concluded that it was a strategic mistake to videotape the testimony because it eroded the President's image and credibility.
50. Such forms might include "fingerprints, hand geometry, retina scans, and signature or voice verification." David A. Petti, An Argument for the Implimentation of a Biometric Authentication System ("BAS"), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 703, 703 (1998).
"[W]idespread regulation of biometrics remains uncharted territory in the legal framework

of the United States." Id.
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Technology has advanced the speed with which documents can be
created and transmitted. As parties execute and rely upon such documents, the law, in turn, has had to contend with and determine the level
of trust to be placed in the technology and the resulting documents.
Early legal cases, for example, followed the invention and widespread
use of the telegram, telex, and mailgram. 5 1 The first cases concerning
each of those commercial transactions dealt with various facets of their
trustworthiness. 52 Later, the law confronted issues of document reliability regarding instruments created by carbon paper copying, mimeograph
machines, and photocopiers. 53 More recently, documents have been created, stored, and printed out through the use of computers. 5 4 Also, documents are often copied and transmitted by facsimile machines, and legal
cases have only begun to address the issues concerning the meaning and
55
effect to be accorded faxed documents.
51. See, e.g., Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869) (finding that a contract made via
telegraph satisfied the Statute of Frauds). Indeed, even modern cases occasionally steal
deal with the basic question of reliability of technological developments invented long ago.
See, e.g., Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466 (Mont. 1989) (finding a contract was evidenced
by a telegram).
52. See, e.g., Matteson v. Noyes, 25 Ill. 591 (1861) (applying the best evidence rule to
telegrams); Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 70 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (addressing whether a telex is a writing); Franklin County Coop v. MFC Services, 441 So.2d 1376
(Miss. 1983) (discussing telex as a signature); Hideca Petroleum Corp. v. Tampimac Oil
Int'l Ltd., 740 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (same); McMillan Ltd. V. Warrior Drilling &
Eng. Co., 512 So.2d 14 (Ala. 1986) (addressing a mailgram signature); Hesenthaler v.
Farzin, 388 Pa. Super. 37 (1989).
53. Nowhere is it mandated that there can be only one "original" of a document or that
only one "original" can have evidentiary weight and can be admissible. There may be multiple originals, and copies of documents may be accurate and admissible as evidence, including documents stored in computers. See FED R. EVID. 1002 (Requirement of Original)
("To prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the original writing, recording
or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided by these rules or by Act of Congress." (emphasis added)). RULE 1004 (Admissibility of Evidence of Contents) proceeds to
set out several circumstances under which the original is not required. RULE 1003 (Admissibility of Duplicates) provides that duplicate are admissible to the same extent as an
original unless: (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2)
in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original." RULE
1003; See also FED. R. EVID. 1001(4).
54. See e.g., FED. R. EvD. 1001(4) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including
enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original.");
People v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (material on a computer disk is a
writing); Clyburn v. Allstate, 826 F. Supp. 955 (D.S.C. 1993) (computer printout is a writing); People v. Rushton, 626 N.E.2d 1378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (computer printout is a
writing).
55. See, e.g., Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc. v. Est. of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633,
635 (N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the contention that a fax machine's automatic imprinting of the
sender's name on each page satisfied the Statute of Frauds' signature requirement); Mad-
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In every instance to date, technology has handily outpaced both statutory and common law in establishing the foundational and experiential
bases for determining document reliability. And in each instance cited
above, by the time reported legal decisions were published the courts had
placed their imprimaturs of trust upon the technology, which was by
then no longer novel and which had become commonly accepted by business people of integrity. 56 This has been the natural pattern of past developments. Law has been relegated to a reactionary position, unable
and unwilling to lead the parade of technology. 5 7 However, as we shall
posit later, the arrival and expansion of digital signature technology may
be the first occasion for technology and statutory law to move forward
58
virtually hand-in-hand.
Of course, the additional historic measure taken to instill greater
trust in written documents has been the act of notarization.5 9 Since ancient times, governments have tended to create and empower the post of
notary public (or its foreign equivalent). 60 These impartial public officials have been charged with the responsibility of identifying document
signers, and in certain circumstances of also administering oaths to document signers. 6 1 Importantly, the functions of notaries public have been
performed in face-to-face settings with document signers and have been
den v. Hegadon, 565 A.2d 725 (N.J. Super. 1989) (discussing a faxed signature); Bogue v.
Sizemore, 608 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. App. Ct 1993) (addressing the faxed acceptance of a contract offer); But see Georgia Dept. of Transportation v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that a fax does not constitute a writing).
56. A problem with electronic commerce may become the rapid pace at which it is
catching on, in comparison to the slower process by which earlier technological developments were adopted. 'The Internet is growing faster than all other technologies that have
preceded it. Radio existed for thirty-eight years before it had 50 million listeners, and television took thireteen years to reach that mark. The Internet has crossed the line in just
four years." Internet Traffic Booming, DAILY SOUTHTOWN [API, April 16, 1998, at 1-2.
57. See generally Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip By Any Other Name
Would Still Be a Potato: The Failure of Law and Its Definitions To Keep Pace With Computer Technology, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 797 (1993).
58. Tod Newcombe, Congress, States Struggle Over Destiny of Digital Signatures, 44
(July 1998), <http://govt-tech.govtech.net/gtmag/1998/july/electroniccommerce/electroniccommerce.shtm>. There is no time to lose, however, in the effort to keep the legislation on
digital signature security contemporaneous with technological and other legislative advances. "We also know governments and laws are not keeping pace with technological
change." Marks, supra note 11, at 36.
59. Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at 874-78. But the number of notaries public in
this country has grown so dramatically that we had about 4.5 million of them at one time
("a preposterous overabundance,") and they have lost much of the historic respect reposed
in their noble office. Michael L. Closen, Why Notaries Get Little Respect, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,
1995, at A23.
60. Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at 882-84.
61. See Michael L. Closen, The Public Official Role of the Notary, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 651, 660-61 (1998).
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conducted within the territorial boundaries of the governmental entities
that commissioned or licensed the notaries (which were sometimes counties or parishes). 62 Many public and private agencies require the services of a traditional notary public to witness signatures on documents as
a security measure. 63 "[To achieve this level of genuine trust of the authenticity of a document, the usual procedure has been that the document be signed by one or more parties, that the identity of each signer be
confirmed by the notary, and that the notary memorialize the

transaction ..

".."64

An important feature of this memorialization of the notarization has
included the attachment of a certificate of notarization, including signing
by the notary and affixing of the notary seal. 6 5 Since notaries must be
individual people, they have had to sign their handwritten formal signatures. 66 Notary seals have developed and changed along with technol62. Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 724 & n.129, citing CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 82008230 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-55-101 to 123 and 12-55-201 to 211 (West 1996);
IDAHO CODE §§ 51-101 to 123 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-12-1 to 20 (Michie 1995); N.Y.
ExEc. LAw §§ 6-130 to 139 (McKinney 1993); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 to 169 (West
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 441-446 (1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 32-1-101 to 113 (Michie
1996). All states have some form of requirement that the notary reside within the state, or
if the notary resides in a contiguous state s/he must conduct business within the forum
state. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 8201(a) (West 1992) (residency required); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-801(a) (1992) (residency required or sole place of business); IOWA CODE ANN. § 77A.3
(West 1992) (residency required or bordering state resident and business); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-12-2(a) (Michie 1995) (residency required). A notary does not have jurisdiction outside
the state of his/her appointment, however. See, e.g., Garza v. Serrato, 699 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985) (denying shorthand reporter for the State of Texas the authority to administer oaths in Mexico). Notaries in Alabama and Kentucky may have only countywide authority, and in Louisiana they have authority only in their parishes (unless they are also
attorneys, in which case they get statewide authority).
63. MICHAEL L. CLOSEN, ET. AL., NOTARY LAW & PRACTICE: CASES & MATERIALS 115
(1997) [hereinafter NOTARY LAW & PRACTICE].

A notary public is:

A public officer whose function is to administer oaths; to attest and certify; by his
hand and official seal, certain classes of documents, in order to give them credit
and authenticity in foreign jurisdictions; to take acknowledgments of deeds and
other conveyances, and certify the same; and to perform certain official acts,
chiefly in commercial matters ....
BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
64. NOTARY LAw & PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 10-11.
65. See generally Karla J. Elliott, The Notarial Seal-The Last Vestige of Notaries
Past, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 903 (1998) (discussing the importance of the affixation of a
notary seal); See also Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at 884-885.
66. See, e.g. ARK STAT. ANN. § 21-14-107(a) ("[Alt the time of notarization, the notary
public shall sign his official signature on every notary certificate."); CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 8206(a)(2) ("The certificate [of notarization] shall be signed by the notary public in the
notary public's own handwriting."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-55-112(1) ("At the time of
notarization, a notary public shall sign his official signature on every notary acknowledgment."). This procedure is in contrast to the system in which certification authorities are
likely to be law firms, banks, mortgage companies, real estate agencies, and other corpo-
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68
ogy-first there were waxen seals, 6 7 then there were metal embossers,
69
The presence of the notarial
and now there are rubber inkstamp seals.
seal lends an air of ceremony, seriousness, and credibility to an instrument, 70 although the presence of a notary seal does not guarantee
71
against either fraud in an instrument or fraud in the notarial process.

Notaries in several states are required to maintain a bond, and a
sequential chronological record, or a journal of their notarizations. 72 In
one state, California, a notarial journal entry for certain real estate documents must include the document signer's right thumbprint. 73 Some
kinds of documents have even been developed solely for the purpose of
adding security to other kinds of written instruments and transactions.
As examples, consider the signature guarantee commonly used in banking and other financial institutions, 74 and the notarial practice of copy
rate/business entities, rather than individual persons. See also Closen & Richards, supra
note 4, at 739 ("[AlIthough notaries must be human beings, certification authorities or
cybernotaries can be entities such as accounting firms, banks, real estate enterprises, and
the like.").
67. Elliott, supra note 65, at 907.
68. Id. at 907.
69. Id. at 907.
70. Douglass M. Fischer, The Seal: Symbol of Security, NAT'L NOTARY MAG., Nov. 1995,
at 10.
71. See the numerous cases of fraud, including notarial collusion, reviewed in NOTARY
LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 247-277, 288-289, 301-310; Closen & Dixon, supra
note 45, at 892; Closen, supra note 61, at 676; Vincent Gnoffo, Comment, Notary Law and
Practicefor the 21st Century:Suggested Modificationsfor the Model Notary Act, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1063, 1086-87 (1997).
72. Peter J. Van Alstyne, The Notary's Duty To Meticulously Maintaina Notary Journal, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 777, 778 & n.5. States requiring notaries to maintain a journal include Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and the District of
Columbia. In contrast, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota and Ohio only require notaries
to journalize notarial protests. Journalization is merely recommended in Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id.
73. Gnoffo, supra note 42, at 805 & n.19 (CAL. GOVT CODE § 8206(a)(7) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996)).
74. "Signature guarantees are not notarial acts, and anyone performing a signature
guarantee must not use the title and seal of a Notary Public when doing so. Signature
guarantees are used by banks and other financial institutions, to authenticate signatures
on documents related to the transfer of securities. The signature on the document is visually compared with another kept on file." NAT'L NOTARY ASS'N., 101 USEFUL NOTARY Tips,
at 40 (1995). See also Signature Guarantees& Notarizations: They're Like Apples and Oranges, THE NOTARY, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 4 ("The difference [between a notarization and a
signature guarantee] is that the notary does not 'guarantee' the signature is not a forgery.
The signature guarantee does in fact make such a guarantee. The financial institution
stands behind the guarantee and is liable if [it] is wrong.").
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certification permitted by statutes in some states. 7 5 The notarial log or
journal whose entries support a document's notarization also illustrates
76
this point.
In the earliest days, this notarial process worked particularly well,
for notaries were few in number and could nearly guarantee the identities of document signers because people simply knew one another in
these face-to-face encounters within their limited geographical territories. 77 As the population grew and as the number and jurisdiction of
notaries grew (to statewide areas), the level of document security provided by the act of notarization became less predictable. 78 Simultaneously, the volume of transaction activity grew. Notaries are now
regularly confronted face-to-face by total strangers bearing a variety of
documents of identification, all of which are subject to alteration and forgery. 79 These crooks can be very skillful at forging documents of identification and forging signatures.8 0 And, more impostors go undetected.
75. See NOTARY LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 195-199 (explaining the authority
of notaries in some states to perform copy certifications). See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 8205(a)(4); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN § 12-55-110(1)(c).
76. Van Alstyne, supra note 72, at 779-782 (discussing the evidentiary value of a notarial journal).
77. Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 718-719.
78. This decline is attributable to several factors including the lack of knowledge and
concern by notaries about their duties, the significant growth in the number of notaries, the
minimal qualifications required of them, and the increase in breaches of ethics by notaries.
See Closen, supra note 59, at A23. Of particular concern is that public and private entities
require far too many documents to be notarized. Id.
79. See Nat'l Notary Ass'n, Spot Those Imposters, NAT'L NOTARY, Jan. 1999, at 27 ("All
identification documents should be carefully inspected for evidence of imposture, alteration
and counterfeiting. There is no absolute and foolproof method to detect every false
ID .... ."); Maudlyne Ihejirika, Latinos Blast Rampant Sale of Fake Documents, Cm. SMTIMES, Aug. 26, 1996, at 18 (discussing the market for and traffic in false identification

documents); INS Raid Snares $80 Million in Bogus Immigration Documents, NOTARY
BULL., Feb. 1999, at 13 ("More than two million documents were discovered by INS agents,
including driver's licenses from California and eight other states, Social Security cards,
Mexican birth certificates and green cards.").
80. See, e.g., First Bank of Childersburg v. Florey, 676 So.2d 324 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(noting that the family member who forged the signature of her father-in-law had commented that she could "sign [his name] as well as he can"); see also the sample of cases in
which forgeries were successfully perpetrated upon notaries: McDonald v. Plumb, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 374, 90 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1970); Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino, 133 Misc. 2d
564, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Iselin-Jefferson Financial v. United California
Bank, 549 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1976). Con-artists have been so successful recently at the process
called identity theft that Congress has enacted a new felony statute to deal with the problem. Identity Theft Now a Felony Under New FederalLaw, NAT'L NOTARY, Jan. 1999, at
25. Furthermore, the risks to the employers of notaries resulting from their vicarious liability for the negligence of notary-employees is part of the reason for the move in some
states to permit employers and notaries to restrict or prohibit the performance of notarial
services during the hours of employment and/or to limit such services only to customers of
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Most importantly, traditional notaries do not play any role in validating the substance of documents. Signatures are notarized; documents are not.8 ' Hence, a real document signer (not an impostor) might
present a forged or altered instrument for signing and notarization of the
signature.8 2 When this happens, the notary has no responsibility to detect the substantive defect of the instrument (with the possible exceptions of cases involving blind and illiterate signers).8 3 Moreover, after
the signature has been notarized, the document may very well be altered
before presentment to another party.8 4 A traditional notary certainly
cannot prevent such subsequent misconduct.
To cope with the enormous volume of commercial and governmental
instruments required to be notarized,8 5 the number of notaries in this
the employer. See Closen, supra note 61, at 676-681, 685-688 (discussing both vicarious
liability and the limitation of notarial services [the "notary private" concept]); Legislative
Review, NOTARY BULL., Feb. 1999, at 6, 7 (pointing out that New Jersey has adopted a new
law allowing notaries employed by financial institutions "to refuse to administer an oath to
any person while on the employer's premises or during the ... hours of employment").
81. See Mint L. Bruno & Michael L. Closen, Notaries Public and Document Signer
Comprehension:A DangerousMirage in the Desertof NotarialLaw and Practice,44 S.D. L.
REV. (1999) [forthcoming]; Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at 889 ("By witnessing a signature, the notary is not attesting to the validity or legal effect of the document on which the
signature appears."); Mint L. Bruno, Comment, To Notarize, OrNot To Notarize... Is Not
a Question of JudgingCompetence or Willingness of Document Signers, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1013 (1998).
82. See, e.g., Facey v. Dept. of State, 132 A.D.2d 698, 518 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1987) (stating
that the signer did not personally appear before notary and that the document contained
false information); McWilliams v. Clem, 743 P.2d 577 (Mont. 1987) (stating that the husband, who signed a deed, persuaded the notary to also notarize the purported signature of
the wife to the same deed although the wife was not present, and that the wife's signature
was a forgery); Butler v. Comic, 918 S.W.2d 697 (Ark. 1996) (stating that two often brothers and sisters presented a quitclaim deed purportedly signed by all ten to a notary for
notarization even though eight were not present, and that some of the signatures were
forgeries); Ameriseal of North East Florida Inc. v. Leiffer, 673 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. Ct. 1996)
(stating that a notary notarized the actual signatures of two document signers although
they were not present and that the document contained false information). Indeed, it could
even be that the notary might tamper with a document after it had been notarized, as was
so in the case of State v. Maryland Casualty Company, 344 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1961).
83. See 5 I.L.C.S. 312/6-104(e) ("A notary public shall not take the acknowledgment of
any person who is blind until the notary has read the instrument to such person."). See
also 66 C.J.S. NOTARIES § 6(c) ("With respect to contracts, an instrument executed by the
parties before a notary in the presence . . . of three witnesses if a party be blind, is an
'authentic act,' and is full proof of the agreement contained in it.").
84. See, e.g., D.T. Parker, Notary Lawsuits [letter], NoTARY BULL., Feb. 1999, at 4
("One of my employees legitimately notarized a document for a customer, who then utilized
a photocopier to transfer her signature and seal impression to another document and commit real estate fraud.").
85. Many documents are notarized needlessly because no notarization requirement exists. NcrARY LAw & PRAcTIcE, supra note 63, at 135. See, e.g., Estate of Peterson, 579
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a purported "contract" which had been
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country has grown quite steadily.8 6 There are now more than 4.2 million
88
notaries public,8 7 which exceeds the population of about 30 states.
What this means is that there are more notaries than there are lawyers,
police officers, doctors and dentists, primary and secondary school teach89
ers, and active duty military personnel.
Remarkably, handwritten signatures affixed to documents while in
the physical presence of notaries and while in the home states of the
notaries have worked fairly effectively thus far.90 But, there is room for
fraud. Although the use of handwritten signatures by signers who have
been required to appear in the physical presence of notaries has served
government and commerce, the world to be dominated by e-mail and the
Internet will be inhospitable to these old-fashioned methods. It will not
be possible or efficient to obtain presently hand-scrawled signatures; it
will not be possible or efficient to insist upon face-to-face meetings; and it
notarized was not a contract at all). Moreover, criminal and civil penalties already exist for
forgery or document falsification. Closen, supra note 59, at A23.
86. Closen, supra note 59, at A23.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Since the purpose of the notary public has been to prevent fraud in the execution of
written paper documents by exercising reasonable care to properly identify document signers, it has been accepted that physical appearance by the signer in the presence of the
notary was necessary. See generally Charles N. Faerber, Being There: The Importance of
Physical Presence to the Notary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 749 (1998). Moreover, since phys-

ical appearance was required and since each state and territory has so many notaries available, this system has been efficient and effective. Limiting the authority of notaries to the
physical boundaries of their home states or territories has seemed appropriate, too. But
even this latter practice has been eroded in recent years by states that allow non-residents
to hold notary commissions if they work there (although the individuals live in neighboring
states) and that grant reciprocity to notaries (provided the notaries' home states do likewise). See Douglass M. Fischer, Where Can I Notarize?, NAT'L NOTARY, July 1997, at 10
(containing an extensive discussion indicating each state's notarial jurisdiction practices).
Furthermore, a key advantage of electronic documents endorsed by digital signatures
should include the absence of a need for the signers to meet face-to-face themselves or with
a third party such as a certification authority. See Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 729.
With the new technologies of video conferencing and facsimile and computer transmissions
of documents, the necessity of the old-fashioned requirement of physical presence before a
notary has been questioned. See NOTARY LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 24-25 (setting out two hypothetical problems about signatures executed during a video conference
and immediately faxed to a notary). See also Glen-Peter Ahlers, The Impact of Technology
on the Notary Process, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 922-924 (1988) (discussing interactive
video). Furthermore, a key advantage of electronic documents endorsed by digital signatures should include the absence of a need for the signers to meet face-to-face themselves or
with a third party such as a certification authority. See Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at
729. Of course, the jurisdictional consequences of electronic commerce will prove to be complex and controversial. See Hope Viner Samborn, Small World, Big Questions, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1999, at 78 ("In the case of electronic commerce, a number of jurisdictions may have
the right to assert their substantive laws upon electronic transaction disputes.").
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will not be efficient to restrict certification authorities operating on-line
in cyberspace to traditional geographical statewide boundaries.
III.

OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE TECHNOLOGY

The Internet is also known as the "information superhighway." As
the nickname implies, it is an extraordinary tool for accessing information, but a poor one for securing it. As an "open network," electronic documents and other data may pass through countless interconnected
computers on their Internet voyage, 91 and the possibility that their contents may be tampered with is fairly high. 92 This problem intensifies the
need for a dependable authentication system. Digital signatures verified
by certification authorities fill a void that handwritten signatures verified by traditional notaries cannot on the Internet, and are perhaps more
useful at accomplishing authentication tasks than their handwritten
93
counterparts.
"A secure digital signature is believed to be the key to allowing technology to further revolutionize electronic commerce." 9 4 It accomplishes
this goal in several ways. First, like a handwritten signature, a digital
signature should identify a document's signer, and it should be difficult
to reproduce without permission. 95 Second, a digital signature verified
by a certification authority ensures the integrity of the document itself,
making it impossible or impracticable to alter it or its contents without
detection. 9 6 While a handwritten signature at the end of a contract truly
authenticates only the last page, a digital signature verified by a certifi91. See A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (discussing the characteristics of the Internet).
92. Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation:From
Written On Paper and Signed In Ink to Electronic Records and Online Authentication, 53
Bus. LAw. 307, 310-11 (1997).
93. Anthony Martin Singer, Note, Electronic Commerce: Digital Signatures and the
Role of the Kansas Digital Signature Act, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 725 (1998). Because of the
binding between a sender and the signed message, a digital signature provides a higher
degree of security and authenticity than a handwritten signature. Randy V. Sabett, International Harmonization in Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchange:A Proposed First Step Toward Signing On the Digital Dotted Line, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 511, 521
(1996).
94. Elizabeth Wasserman, Signing On With Digital Signatures New Laws May Allow
Computer Validation, PHOENIX GAZ., Aug. 29, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 2824237.
95. Information Security Committee, Electronic Commerce Division, DigitalSignature
Guidelines, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. Sci. & TECH. 13 [hereinafter Digital Signature Guidelines].
96. Id. at 6-7. Because a digital signature uses the actual text of the message when
formulating the encryption algorithm, the slightest alteration will prevent the message
from decrypting properly. A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 54 (1996). "Two things happen to make a
digital signature valid: A digital snapshot of the document is taken; and a signature, based
on the user's certificate, is created." Klau, supra note 6, at 14.
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cation authority authenticates the entire document down to the last
punctuation mark. 97 Third, a digital signature verified by a certification
authority eliminates the possibility of repudiation by the sender. 98 Finally, electronic documents can be encoded with a digital time stamp,
allowing the transmission time to be ascertained. 9 9 Such non-repudiation features not only assure the recipient that the sender cannot falsely
deny that the document was sent, but also prevent either party from unilaterally altering the terms of an agreement. 10 0 These technological devices should make electronic document certification a safe and reliable
means for ensuring security during an electronic transaction.
A digital signature is not a computerized image of a handwritten
signature. 01 ' Rather, a "digital signature" is a phrase of art describing a
systematic scrambling of characters to guarantee security and authenticity. 10 2 More specifically, digital signatures are created and verified
through the use of cryptography, ensuring the authenticity of an electronic document's content and the sender's identity 10 3 The cryptographic process used to create digital signatures is currently known as
"public key cryptography." 10 4 This process involves the use of an algorithm using two distinctly separate but mathematically related "keys,"
or a "keypair."10 5 A private key, held only by the sender, is used to generate the digital signature and convert the document into an unintel97. Sabett, supra note 93, at 521. To analogize, imagine that the parties to a contract
were to sign their names to each and every character on a contract. Id. Cases where
signed documents were altered do arise. See, e.g., Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Moantain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990); Citizens Nat'l Bank of Downers Grove v.
Mormon, 398 N.E.2d 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Newell v. Edwards, 173 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1970).
98. Suppose, for example, that a party sends an offer to enter into a contract, and the
offeree accepts. Later, the offeror tries to deny that the offer was ever made. The offeree
can prove the offer's existence by using the offeror's public key to decrypt the document.
This would eliminate the possibility of repudiation, since only the offeror's private key
could have created the original encrypted message. See Sabett, supra note 93, at 522.
99. A digital time stamp provides an extra measure of security should a private key
become compromised. For further discussion of digital time stamping. See DAVE BAYER, ET
AL., IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY AND RELIABILITY OF DIGITAL TIME-STAMPING, IN SEQUENCES
II: METHODS IN COMMUNICATION, SECURITY, AND COMPUTER SCIENCE (Renato Capocelli, et

al. eds., 1993).
100. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 7.
101. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 92, at 310.
102. MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY 145 (3d ed. 1997).
103. DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 8. Cryptography is a mathematical
process that scrambles documents into an unintelligible form (known as encryption) and
then converts them back again (known as decryption). Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Hardware and Software using this two key system are collectively referred to as
an "asymmetric cryptosystem." Id. See also Hill, supra note 4, at 10. Asymmetric
cryptosystems function at a slower rate than symmetric cryptosystems (which use the same
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ligible form. 10 6 A corresponding public key is used to transform the
document back to its original form.' 0 7 Reliability and authenticity is
thus ensured, because the keys operate together in such a way that the
digital signature generated by the private key cannot be practicably
decrypted by any key other than the public key belonging to the sender
(much like two interlocking secret decoder rings from a cereal box, provided they are unique). 0 8 The sender's public key is made accessible to
all who need it by posting it on a Web site or some other type of directory
or repository provided by the Certification Authority. 10 9
Suppose diamond buyer Jean wanted to send a digitally signed
message to diamond seller Carroll. How would Jean go about doing so?
First, Jean would draft the document" 0 and then send it through a
mathematical algorithm called a hash function, 1 11 which would produce
a number known as a "hash value" or "hash result." 112 Jean would next
key to encrypt and decrypt), but are more secure. See GONCALvEs, supra note 35, at 608,
620.
106. DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 8. See also Klau, supra note 6, at
14 ("[T]he individual keeps the private key in a safe place on his or her disk drive and uses
it to sign documents.").
107. DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 8.
108. R.J. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce On the Internet and the Statute of Frauds,
49 S.C. L. Rav. 787 (1998).
109. DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 8. See also Hill, supra note 4, at 10
("Although the public key may be restricted to only one or a few users, it is usually made
publicly available through an online repository that is operated by an independent
party. . . " known as a certification authority;) Klau, supra note 6, at 14 ("The public key is
distributed to all correspondents . . ").
110. Digital signatures appear as gibberish, a mere stream of characters. See Sabett,
supra note 93, at 521. A digitally signed message might look like this:
- BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE Name: Chicago Widget Corp.
Order No. 2523
Date: June 2, 1999
This document is an order for 500 blue widgets at the price of $100/each.
- END SIGNED MESSAGE Public ID# 7Y4737Y34874
Public key available at:
http://www.certification.authority.com/chicagowidget/publickey.html
- BEGIN SIGNATURE I86T7887tj76UJSLkj78342gd56ET445eO98Ujhfr5R987yur5UpFTf4ERD897gW
35YfdlOAfavg4tggg54fglIJG23o9kj l2OgoND 1998
- END SIGNATURE Id. at 520-21.
111. Hash functions are used to both generate and verify digital signatures. See Digital
Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 9.
112. Id. This hash value or hash result is unique to the digitally signed message. Id. If
the message were tampered with in any way, a different hash result would be produced,
signifying alteration. Id. A hash value or hash result is a mathematical algorithm used to
create a unique "fingerprint" known as a "hash value" or "hash result." The hash value, or
hash result, has also been called a "message digest." See Greenwood & Campbell, supra
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encrypt the hash result with a private key, thus, forming the electronic
document and digital signature. 1 13 The document could then be electronically mailed directly to Carroll. After receiving the document, Carroll can verify Jean's identity by decrypting the digitally signed
document using Jean's public key. 1 14 If successful, Carroll most likely
can be confident that Jean is the actual sender of the document. 1 15 To
confirm that the document has not been tampered with, Carroll can use
the same hash function that Jean used earlier. 116 If the two-hash results match, the document would appear not to have been altered, 1 17 and
the parties can be somewhat assured that the integrity of the document
has not been compromised. However, the question still remains as to
how parties might more reliably identify a key pair to the entity with
which they are communicating. 1 18
At this stage the certification authority's role becomes paramount. 1 19 For heightened security and reliability, the communication
from Jean to Carroll could be sent through the trusted intermediary of a
certification authority. Certification authorities have several duties, including key pair management, as well as overseeing issuance, distribution, suspension and revocation of digital certificates. 120
The
certification authority acts as a trustworthy third party by assigning key
pairs and digital certificates that verify the sender's identity. 12 1 The cernote 92, at 314 (describing a substantially similar sequence). The possibility of ascertaining a private key by accessing the hash result has been termed "computationally infeasible." DigitalSignature Guidelines,supra note 95, Tutorial, at 9. This is a relative concept,
however, based on several factors including the data's value, the length of time and money
expended, and future technological advances. Id. at 8 n.23.
113. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 92, at 314. At this point Sara's identity as the
sender is "stamped" onto the document and established for purposes of authentication. Id.
at 314 n.15.
114. Id. at 314.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 92, at 314. Conceivably, a criminal could generate a key pair and fraudulently claim that it belongs to Sara Sender. Id.
119. One such service provider is a company called VeriSign, Inc. VeriSign provides
digital certificates of varying types, from the "Class 1" certificate for casual web and e-mail
use to the ultra-secure "Class 4," issued only after a thorough investigation. The site is
located at <http'//verisign.com>.
120. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, SECTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AMERIJ. 243, 254 (1998).

CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TUTORIAL, 38 JURIMETRICS

121. Froomkin, supra note 96, at 55. "A certificate is a digitally signed statement by a
certification authority that provides independent confirmation of an attribute claimed by a
person proffering a digital signature." Id. A certificate should include: (1) the identification
and digital signature of the certification authority; (2) identifies or names the subscriber;
(3) identifies the certificates valid operational period; and (4) provides the subscriber's public key. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 29.
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tificate identifies the public key as "the subject of the certificate" and verifies that the sender identified by the certificate controls the matching
private key.' 22 A certificate may typically contain the identity of the issuing certification authority, identification of the subscriber, the subscriber's public key, and the digital signature of the certification
authority.12 3 It might also contain additional information, such as a certificate's expiration date, a statement of the certification authority's financial responsibility (or at least a reference to see the authority's
repository for a detailed statement of financial responsibility), or the context in which the public key may be used.' 24 The certificate is then made
25
available in a repository or on the certification authority's Web site.'
The digitally signed document's recipient may then access the sender's
certificate, access a copy of the sender's public key, and decrypt the document. 1 26 Thus, the receiver can rest assured that the sender is indeed
who he or she purports to be, and that the document has not been
27
altered.'
The security of a private key might be compromised, for example,
where an unauthorized person obtained the private code.' 28 This failure
of security could result from lack of diligence by the private key holder
and/or from fraudulent practice by the unauthorized user.' 2 9 The
America Online e-mail disruption, cited earlier,' 30 illustrates that inattention to security can be a most serious problem in electronic commerce.
The American Bar Association developed an extensive set of Digital Signature Guidelines, which address this problem in several ways. 13 1 First,
the private key-holding subscriber is held to a duty of care in its safekeeping. 132 Second, the private key-holder should be enabled to "disas122. Robertson, supra note 108, at 787.
123. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 92, at 315.
124. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TuL L. REV. 1177, 1202 (1998).
125. Id. A repository is an online database of certificates and is used to verify digital
signatures. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, at 19.
126. Robertson, supra note 108, at 787.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 732-734 (discussing the "alarming increase in computer-generated fraud"
and the security problems associated with "inadequate identification procedures" for computer users).
129. See id. at 737 ("The only way that a digital signature's integrity should be subject
to compromise is if the private key holder is negligent in safeguarding the key, or intentionally gives others access to the signature software and provides them with the passphrase.").
130. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
131. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, Tutorial, at 8 n.20.
132. Id. The sender has several methods at his disposal to safeguard the private key. A
particularly safe method is the use of a "cryptographic token" (a "smart card," for example).
Id. This device activates the signature program using an internal microchip, allowing the
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sociate himself from the key by temporarily suspending or permanently
revoking his certificate and publishing these actions in a 'certificate revocation list,' or CRL." 1 33 Other possibilities to ensure security are dating
34
certificates when they are issued, and limiting their period of validity. 1
The certificate should give explicit reference to the CRL, insisting that it
be checked regularly. 13 5 Individual receivers might decide to accept certificates issued in the last few days, or will have to determine which certification authorities are the most reputable, trustworthy, and
financially responsible. 13 6 Also, a certification authority "must utilize
trustworthy systems in performing its services." 137 To ensure that all
statutory guidelines are followed closely, both the Utah and Washington
statutes require that a certified public accountant with expertise in computer security audit each certification authority's records at least once
per year. 138 Finally, the entities (and in particular the people) who will
perform electronic document verifications must be free from corrupt
influences.
How do we protect ourselves against fraudulent certification authorities? Or suppose a certification authority's system is compromised?
One certification authority can verify the authenticity of another certification authority, or a certificate issued by another certification authority. 139 However, in this hierarchy situation, a certification authority will
ultimately exist that is not verified by another. 140 "Cybernotaries that
certify other Cybernotaries are said to participate in a certificate chain,
with a root certificate at the bottom of the tree." 14 1 Clearly, there must
be a root certification authority that will instill the highest degree of confidence among certification authorities, subscribers and relying parties
who are higher in the tree. 14 2 Utah's digital signature statute authodocument to be signed without the private key ever being divulged outside the token, nor
does it enter the sender's computer memory. Id. The sender is required to physically produce the token, and security measures such as a fingerprint scan can verify the physical
presence of the token's proper holder. Id.
133. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, Tutorial, at 8 n.20.
134. Froomkin, supra note 96, at 61.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.1; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.34.100 (Supp. 1998).
138. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.110 (Supp. 1998); see UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3202 (Supp. 1996).
139. Winn, supra note 124, at 1202. See also Hill, supra note 4, at 11 ("How does a
recipient know that the certification authority isn't an impostor? The recipient can verify
the authority's digital signature using a public key on another public certificate .. .
140. Hill, supra note 4, at 11.
141. Froomkin, supra note 96, at 56, (citing Warwick Ford, Advances in Public-Key Certificate Standards,SIG SEcuRrrY, AUDIT & CONTROL REV., July 1995, at 9, 10).
142. Winn, supra note 124, at 1202.
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rizes the state to act as the root authority by regulating certification authority licensing. 143 Other states may adopt this approach as well,
hopefully rewarding only a few certification authorities with licenses after conforming to strict guidelines. 144
IV.

THE NOTARY PUBLIC MODEL

There are several parallels between the positions of the traditional
notary public and the certification authority. Indeed, those similarities
have appeared so strong that, as noted previously, the two positions even
share a common title within the shorthand reference "cybernotary." 1 45
However, the central question of this paper is whether the notary should
really serve as the model for the certification authority. The authors
have concluded that the differences between the two positions far outweigh their commonalities, and that sound business and legal policy
warrant distancing the position of certification authority from the wholly
unsatisfactory notary model.
Both notaries public and certification authorities are creatures of
1 46
statute. That is, both positions are created and regulated by statute.
While every state sets forth fairly detailed statutory guidelines for notaries, 147 only a handful of jurisdictions have passed extensive digital sig143. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201 to 46-3-504 (1997).
144. Froomkin, supra note 96, at 56, (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-104 to 46-3-201).
145. Florida has even adopted the country's first statute creating an amended notary
commission for notaries who wish to become qualified to perform "electronic notarizations"
by signing with their "digital signatures" registered with a Florida certification authority.
See FLA. STAT., § 117.20.
146. Closen, supra note 61, at 651 (noting the statutory origin of the office of notary
public); Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 739 (noting that digital signatures and certification authorities are authorized by statutes).
147. See ALA. CODE §§ 36-20-1 to 32 (1991); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.50.010 to 190 (Michie
1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-311 to 317 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 21-14-101 to 05 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1996); CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 8200-8230 (West 1992
& Supp. 1997); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-55-101 to 123 and 12-55-201 to 211 (West
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-91 to 95a and 7-33a (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4301 to 4401 (1991 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-801 to 817
(1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 117.01 to 108 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4517-1 to 34 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 456-6 to 18 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 51-101 to 123 (1994); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/1-101 to 8-104
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-16-1-1 to 16-8-5 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 586.1 (West 1992); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-101 to 401 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 423.010 to 990 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 35:1 to 555 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 951 to 958 (West
1989 & Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 68, §§ 1 to 13 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 222, §§ 1 to 11 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 5.1041
to 5.1072 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-01 to 12 (West 1991 & Supp.
1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-33-1 to 23 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 486-100 to
595 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-5-201 to 611 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
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nature legislation at this time. 148 However, commentators predict that
every state will pass digital signature legislation over the next decade. 149 To date, the same governmental agencies that oversee notaries
have tended to be designated as the agencies to supervise certification
authorities. 150 Most often, those agencies are the Secretary of State's
offices. 15 1 The statutes establishing both positions usually treat many of
152
the same topics, including such matters as application procedures,
1 53
54
155
qualifications,
financial responsibility,1 fees or fee schedules,
du38 64-101 to 215 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 240.001 to 330 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 455:1 to 15 (1992 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:7-10 to 21 (West
1986 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14- 12-1 to 20 (Michie 1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 6130 to 38 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 10A-1 to 16 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 44-06-01 to 14 (1993 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 147.01 to 14
(Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1 to 121 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 194.005 to 990 (1991); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 31 to 169
(West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 42-30-1 to 15 (1993 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 261-10 to 120 (Law Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 18-1-1 to 14
(Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-16-101 to 309 (1994); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 406.001 to 024 (West 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-1 to 19 (1993 & Supp. 1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 441 to 446 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47.1-1 to 33 (Michie 1996 &
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.44.010 to 903 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); W.VA.
CODE §§ 29-4-1 to 16 (1992 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 137.01 (West 1989 & Supp.
1996); Wyo. STAT. §§ 32-1-101 to 113 (Michie 1996).
148. See, e.g., Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-121 (West Supp. 1997)); California
(CAL. GOVT CODE § 16.5 (West Supp. 1998)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT . §§ 19a-25a
(1997)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70 to 75 (West Supp. 1998)); Iowa (IowA CODE
§ 48A.13 (Supp. 1998)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2616 (Supp. 1997)), Louisiana (LA.
REV. STAT . ANN. § 40:2144 (West Supp. 1998)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 221.173 (Supp.
1998)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25- 63-1 to 11 (Supp. 1997)); New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN §§ 14-15-1 to 6 (Michie Supp. 1997)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 504
(Supp. 1997)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-467 to 469 (Michie Supp. 1997)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.34.010 to 903 (West Supp. 1998)); and Wyoming (Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1-306 (Michie 1997)).
149. Charles N. Faerber, Electronic Notarization: Florida, Utah Lead the Way, THE
NAT'L NOTARY, July 1998, at 21.
150. See supra note 40 (discussing state agencies that monitor both notaries and certification authorities).

151. Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 719 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-311
(1992); AR. CODE ANN. § 21-14-101 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOVT CODE § 8200 (West 1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-104 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-91 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 77A.3 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53- 102 (Michie
1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 423.010 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:7-11 (West 1986 & Supp.
1996); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 130 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996).
152. See 152 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 312/2-101 to 106.
153. Id. at 312/2-102.
154. Id. at 312/2-105.
155. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-12 (Supp. 1997) (setting notary fees at $5); see
also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.040 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing secretary of state to
establish reasonable fees for electronic document certification services).

1999]

DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION

ties, 15 6 misconduct, 157 and discipline. 158
Further, as already noted, both notaries public and certification authorities possess the professional and legal duty to accurately identify
document signers (without guaranteeing the proper identity of those
signers). 15 9 Like the traditional notary, the certification authority will
play a critical role in business transactions where a third party is needed
to authenticate signatures. 160 In a fast changing global electronic marketplace, there are few constants. Yet, among them are the pervasive
problems of dishonesty and fraud, 16 1 and the likelihood of dealing with
anonymous people in far away parts of the world. 162 More than ever
before, it is essential that parties have confidence in the identities of
their counterparts to transactions. 1 63 It is only at this point that the
parties may "proceed under an umbrella of trust."1 64 Hence, the notary
and certification authority will share the same identity verification purpose. Those are the common features of the two positions.
156. See ILL. Comp. STAT. 312/3-101 to 4-101.
157. See, e.g., MODEL NOTARY ACT, § 6-203 (1984) (allowing for criminal prosecution of
notarial misconduct; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.160 (West 1991) (making notarial conduct a gross misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.502 (Supp. 1998) (stating that certification authority may be subject to both injunctive relief and criminal
prosecution for misconduct).
158. See, e.g., MODEL NOTARY ACT § 6-201 (1984) (giving state power to revoke a notarial
commission); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.170 (West 1991) (allowing state to revoke
notary's appointment); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.400 (allowing secretary of
state to discontinue recognition of certificate repository).
159. Notaries have never been legally expected to serve as guarantors of the identities
of document signers, but merely to act with reasonable care in the process of identifying
signers. See NOTARY LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 74, at 4 ('[Tlhe notary does not 'guarantee'
the signature [of the document signer] is not a forgery.") Id. "A notary is required to exercise reasonable care in verifying a signer's identity and to ensure the signature being notarized belongs to the person appearing before her. If the notary exercises reasonable care in
making those determinations, she cannot be held liable." Id. at 5.
160. See generally Froomkin, supra note 96 (discussing the importance of a certification
authority).
161. See Wendy Lee, Intensifying Efforts Against Internet Piracy, NEW STRAITS TIMES,
Apr. 23, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 3977488. The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection was not laughing recently when a con-artist began selling
franchises for the fictional "U.S. Consumer Protections Agency" over the Internet at $6000.
Richard Wolffe, FTC Not Amused By Internet Ad Offering To Franchise Its Agency, THE
PLAIN DEALER, July 4, 1998, at 8A, availablein 1998 WL 4143099. In 1997, the FTC uncovered a fraudulent $30 million Internet business deal. Id.
162. A New Yorker cartoon quips "On the Internet, they can't tell you're a dog." Charles
R. Merrill, An Attorney's Roadmap to the Digital Signature Guidelines,452 PLUP, at 379,
382 (1996).
163. William A. Reinsch, Should Uncle Sam Control U.S. Encryption Technology Exports?, INSIGHT, Sept. 8, 1997, at 24, available in 1997 WL 11444408.
164. Chuck Appleby, Encryption Making Security A Reality, 508 INFO. WK., Jan. 2,
1995, at 38, available in 1995 WL 7138713.
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By contrast, the differences between the two posts are far more substantial both in quantity and quality. Foremost among the differences is
that a notary public is a commissioned public official, 165 a public servant
with a long tradition of fiduciary responsibility to the citizenry' 66 and
with a duty to be reasonably available to service all members of the public without discrimination1 6 7-including without limiting notarial service only to customers or clients of the notary or the notary's
16 9
employer. 168 Thus, the title is notary public, not notary private.
While the state issues licenses to all sorts of others, such as vehicle driv17 2
barbers and beauticians, 1 73
ers, 170 private detectives, 17 1 attorneys,
175
174
morticians, 17 6 gun owners, 1 77
real estate brokers,
pharmacists,
and so on, 178 these others do not become public officers the way that notaries do. 17 9 At most, certification authorities should be licensed by the
state just as so many others are licensed to provide a basis for state oversight and public protection and to assess the subject matter of the license
for revenue reasons. Beyond those basic purposes, market forces can and
should drive the private sector functioning of certification authorities.
Most assuredly, certification authorities do not need to be public officials.
There are a couple of other functions of certification authorities not
possessed by notaries. The traditional notary essentially affixes his/her
signature and seal, and the transaction is complete. Once the notarization on a paper document takes place, the process is completed.18 0 Any
165. Closen, supra note 59, at A23 ("Notaries are not merely licensed, they are almost
always commissioned by elected officials such as the state governor or the secretary of
state.").
166. Closen, supra note 61, at 657 (quoting Humphrey's 1948 book to the effect that
"[o]fficially a notary public is the agent of the public only . . . ."). The notary has been a
public servant or public official since ancient times. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at
874-875.
167. Closen, supra note 61, at 685-689.
168. Id. at 687-688.
169. Id. at 685.
170. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101 et seq.
171. Id. at 5/11-42-1.
172. 70 ILL. Comp. STAT. 205-1.
173. 65 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/11-42-1.
174. 225 I.L.C.S. 85/6 et seq.
175. Id. at 455/2 et seq.
176. Id. at 41/5-5 et seq.
177. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/2 et seq.
178. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-42-6; see also 65 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/11-42-2.
179. See generally Closen, supra note 61 (discussing the public notary).
180. Douglas M. Fischer, Cancel a Notarization?,THE NAT'L NOTARY, Sept. 1995, at 12.
Moreover, the relationship between the notary and document signer for whom a notarization is performed is usually quite short. See Closen, supra note 61, at 661, 669. Its brevity
is one of the reasons why some reject the notion that a signer-notary relationship can be a
principal-agent or fiduciary relationship. Id. at 669.
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oversights or errors cannot be corrected, nor can the notarization be
"taken back" if an error is discovered. 18 1 In contrast, certification authorities not only may, but must subsequently suspend or revoke a certificate in such comparable situations. 182 Unlike a notary, the certification
authority must continue to watch for fraud even after the document is
authenticated. A certification authority must suspend or revoke a certificate if the certification authority confirms that a "material fact represented in the certificate is false," a material prerequisite to the
certificate's issuance was missing, or the certification authority's private
key or trustworthy system was compromised in such a way that the certificate's reliability is in question. 18 3 Regardless of the circumstances
surrounding a certificate's suspension or revocation, a certification authority must "publish notice of the suspension or the revocation if the
certificate was published, and otherwise must disclose the fact of suspension or revocation on inquiry by a relying party."18 4 Thus, the certification authority's services toward the subscriber continue indefinitely, as
does the duty owed.
Even when the relationship is ending, certification authorities, like
attorneys, are limited to the manner in which they may discontinue their
services.18 5 Before discontinuing, a certification authority must: (1) review all the valid certificates it has issued and notify subscribers listed in
those certificates; (2) do so in such a manner that disruption to subscribers and relying parties is minimized; and (3) make arrangements to preserve the certification authority's records.' 8 6 These duties bear striking
similarities to the fiduciary duties imposed upon attorneys. 18 7 While the
ABA Digital Signature Guidelines explicitly reject a fiduciary duty of
care toward the subscriber,' 8 8 the certification authority's obligations
suggest otherwise.' 8 9
181. Fisher, supra, note 180, at 12.
182. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.11.
183. Id. The certification authority must promptly notify the subscriber after such suspension or revocation. Id.
184. Id. § 3.12.
185. Id. § 3.13.
186. Id.
187. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983) (restricting
attorneys from withdrawing from a matter where it has a "material adverse effect on the
interests of the client . . ").
188. See DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 2.4 ("A certification authority is
a fiduciary to a subscriber where a certification authority holds that subscriber's key or
where provided by contract. A certification is not otherwise a fiduciary to a subscriber and
is not a fiduciary to any relying party, except where provided by contract or by law.").
189. It is somewhat paradoxical that a certification authorities' duties rival those of an
attorney, yet under the A.B.A. guidelines, should not be regarded as a fiduciary.
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The greatest concern the authors have about the constant refrain
expressed touting the similarities of notaries and certification authorities is that it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. That would be tragic.
There are far too many notaries-about 4.2 million of them. 190 As they
have proliferated in number, they have diminished in stature and respect. 19 1 The Supreme Court observed that "the significance of the position [of notary public] has necessarily been diluted by changes in the
19 2
appointment process and by the wholesale proliferation of notaries."
This overpopulation problem cannot be allowed to develop for certification authorities, for it is the most serious fault of the present notary public system in this country.
There are no substantial general education requirements for notaries. 193 But, lawyers, certified public accountants, dentists, doctors,
schoolteachers, and other professionals must fulfill minimum general education requirements-such as obtaining a college degree. 194 Individuals acting as certification authorities should be required to satisfy a
substantial general education requirement. 19 5 Unfortunately, notaries
are only rarely required to undergo specialty training or testing in notarial practice, ethics and law. 196 But, many other professionals must satisfy significant specialized educational and testing requirements-such
as those demanded of public school teachers, medical doctors, attorneys,
certified public accountants, and real estate brokers. 1 97 Certification au190. See The 1997 NNA Notary Census, NAT'L NOTARY, May 1997, at 30 (reporting the
total of United States notaries in 1997 to be 4,290,634).
191. Closen, supra note 59, at A23.
192. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 223 (1984).
193. Closen, supra note 59, at A23.
194. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-5b (1998) (requiring a candidate for an alternative certification as a public school teacher to hold a bachelor's degree).
195. See Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Cyberbusiness Need Supernotaries,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A19 (Certification authorities "will necessarily possess significant economic power, and that is an unsettling prospect, given the historic underqualification of notaries in this country.").
196. See Closen, supra note 59, at A23 (pointing out that few states "require a specific
level of general education" for notaries). As indicated, only a few states require training for
notaries, and those requirements are either minimal or apply only in certain situations, or
both: Kentucky (exam for non-attorneys only), New York (exam for non-attorney notaries
only), North Carolina (must complete a community college course), Ohio (judge may require
an exam), and Wyoming (exam encouraged but not required). See also John T. Henderson
and Peter D. Kovach, Administrative Agency Oversight of Notarial Practice, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 857, 865 (1998) ("To the extent ... that most states do not require notary
education or testing most notaries public are forced to rely upon themselves to learn how to
properly exercise their commissions.").
197. For example, in Illinois, there is an alternative certification process for public
school teachers requiring candidates to undergo an intensive an intensive course of study
and testing on basic skills and subject matter knowledge. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-5b
(1998).
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thorities should be added to that list. 198
Many notaries public are unaware of their legal and ethical responsibilities. 199 Moreover, notaries have little financial incentive to learn.
Most states strictly regulate the amount of fees that may be charged for
notarial services. 20 0 Notaries who earn a mere $2 on average per notarization may have little motivation to learn to follow their legal obligations. 20 1 This in turn leads to further trivialization of the notary, as well
as increased incidents of notarial fraud. 20 2 Notwithstanding the paramount importance of a notary's services to commerce and society, in the
United States the role of notary public is deemed "essentially clerical and
ministerial." 20 3 In contrast, notaries in other countries are held in great
esteem as legal professionals, charging substantial fees and bearing significant responsibilities. 20 4 In Mexico, the "latin notariate" enjoys
favorable social status and commands a high income. 20 5 The latin
notariate is considered a public officer after a long period of professional
preparation. 20 6 Japanese notaries also command handsome fees, sometimes in excess of $500, while their American counterparts are often paid
a paltry $1 or $2.207 Notaries in England also charge substantially more
than the American notary, sometimes as much as $250 for a signature
198. Closen & Richards, supra note 195, at A19 ("It would make sense for states to
develop a uniform standard exam [for certification authorities] much like the multi-state
bar exam or uniform CPA exam, to insure a level of competency."). Paralegals may become
the next business group to become licensed or regulated. See ParalegalGuidelines Suggested: First In Country To Be Licensed?, NOTARY BULL., Dec. 1998, at 13 (describing the
effort in New Jersey to consider the matter and to issue a 100+ page report recommending
a program of study and licensure for paralegals).
199. Closen & Richards, supra note 195, at A19.
200. Closen, supra note 59, at A23.
201. See id.

202. See id; see also Closen, supra note 59, at A23 ("Notary-related dishonesty appears
to be on the rise.").
203. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 217 (1984). See supra notes 190-198 and text, for
further discussion on the lack of respect and importance placed on American notaries
public.
204. NOTARY LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 417. "Now, the [foreign] civil law Notary is as different from the U.S. common law Notary as an emergency medical technician
is from a neurosurgeon. Where one [the foreign civil law notary] has achieved years of
specialized education and training, the other [the ordinary U.S. notary] possesses a more
modest, but no less important proficiency." Deborah M. Thaw, Notaries Everywhere Share
the Same Essential Values, NAT'L NOTARY, Jan. 1999, at 5.
205. Guillermo Floris Margadant, The Mexican Notariate,6 CAL. W. L. REV. 218 (1970),
reprinted in NOTARY LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 418.
206. Id.
207. Thomas W. Tobin, The Execution "Under Oath"of U.S. Litigation Documents: Must
SignaturesBe Authenticated?, JAPANESE INSURANCE NEWS, July/Aug. 1995, at 34, reprinted
in NOTARY LAw & PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 418-19.
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authentication. 20 8 Only a handful of "notaires" are appointed in France,
while there only around 1000 "notaris" in the Netherlands. 20 9 The
Dutch notaris essentially act as attorneys, undertaking such tasks as
drafting wills and contracts or setting up corporations. 2 10 Unfortunately, these foreign notary-professionals view our notarial system as a
joke when it comes to international transactions. 2 11 In several countries, foreign business people "rarely take American notarizations seriously, and sometimes reject them."2 12 While digital signature legislation
does not presently restrict fees for an electronic certification, such fees
should at least be high enough to encourage certification authorities to
2 13
learn and abide by their legal obligations.
A significant impediment to the position and prestige of notaries in
this country2 14 is the almost complete lack of financial accountability required of them. 2 15 Although some thirty states require each notary to be
bonded, the bond levels (ranging between $500 and $15,000) are nominal
and inadequate in today's economy. 2 16 About twenty of those thirty
208. Id.
209. Rene W. Clumpkens, The Role of the Notary Under the Laws of the Netherlands,
With Respect to the Transfer of Title and Encumbrance of Registered Aircraft, 17 AIR AND
SPACE LAw, at 118 (1992), reprinted in NOTARY LAw & PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 419-20.
210. Id.
211. Closen, supra note 59, at A24.
212. Id.
213. By contrast, notaries are paid nominal amounts for their services, which practice
necessarily suggests a lack of importance of those services. See Closen, supra note 59, at
A23.
214. The concern about the adequacy (or inadequacy) of notary bonds is almost uniquely
an issue for this country because notaries in so many other countries are full legal professionals-often lawyers as well as notaries. See Closen, supra note 61, at 699 (discussing
Central and South American, French, and Japanese notaries).
215. See Closen, supra note 59, at A23 (arguing that the required notary bond amounts
are so low as to be "useless and misleading"); Closen & Dixon, supra note 45, at 893 (stating
that "[tihe notarial bond will do little to protect the notary").
216. Michael J. Osty, Notary Bonds and Insurance: Increasingthe Protection for Consumers and Notaries,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 839, 845-46 & n.30. State bond requirements
vary considerably. See ALA CODE. § 36-20-3 (1991) ($10,000); ALASKA STAT. § 44.50.120
(Michie 1989) ($1,000); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-315 (1992 & Supp. 1995) ($5,000); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 21-14- 101(d)(1) (Michie 1996) ($4,000); CAL GOV'T CODE. § 8212 (West 1992 & Supp.
1996) ($15,000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-803 (1992) ($2,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 117.01(4) (West
1996) ($5,000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 456-5 (1995) ($1,000); IDAHO CODE § 51-105(2) (1994)
($10,000); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/2-105 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) ($5,000); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 33-16-2-1(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) ($5,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-102 (West 1983)
($7,500); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 423.010-.990 (Michie 1992) (ranging usually from $500 to
$1,000 depending upon the county); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35:1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996)
($5,000); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 55-110 (West 1991) ($10,000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-331 (1991) ($5,000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 486-235 (West & Supp. 1996) ($10,000); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-5-405 (1995) ($5,000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-102 (1990) ($10,000); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 240.030 (Michie 1996) ($10,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-12-3 (Michie 1995) ($500);
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states set notary bond levels between $1000 and $5000.217 The other
twenty states do not require any surety bond at all for notaries, 2 18 and
no state requires notaries to be covered by errors and omissions insurance. 2 19 The result is that users of notarial services are not statutorily
protected in realistic ways against negligent and intentional misconduct
by notaries, 2 20 because the financial injuries caused by notarial malpractice can readily exceed the trivial notary bond levels. 221 While other professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, are not required to
carry bonds or insurance, the system of protection of their consumers
against malpractice tends to work because those professionals ordinarily
carry adequate insurance and/or possess sufficient assets to pay claims
against them. 222 Of course, bond and even insurance coverage can be
required by statute, 22 3 as mandatory automobile liability insurance illustrates.2 24 Certification authorities should be required to have minimum (though substantial) levels of bond and insurance coverage in order
to adequately protect against both intentional and negligent misconduct. 2 2 5 Additionally, the statutes should provide that the amount of
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-06-03 (1993) ($7,500); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 2 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1996) ($1,000); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 154 (1996) ($3,000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 18-1-2 (Michie 1995) ($500); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-16-104 (1993) ($10,000); TEx. GOVT
CODE ANN § 406.010 (WEST 1990) ($2,500); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-4 (1993) ($5,000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.020 (West 1991) ($10,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 137.01 (West
1989) ($500); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-104 (Michie 1996) ($500).
217. Osty, supra note 216, at 845 n.30.
218. Id. at 851-55 (calling for states to require errors and omissions insurance for
notaries).

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Most notaries public on the other hand tend not to be highly paid professionals, but
rather work in businesses other than the provision of notarial services. Most notaries
work as bank tellers, secretaries, sales persons, paralegals, clerks, and the like-positions
in which the notarial function occupies only a small part of the job description. See Closen,
supra note 61, at 662 ("Unlike most other public officials, notaries do not serve full-time in
their official capacity. It is a sideline to their principal positions.").
223. See, e.g., Shavers v. Attorney General, 267 N.W.2d 72, 77-79 (Mich. 1978) (finding
state imposed insurance requirement constitutional); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 358 A.2d 828 (N.J.
1976); Andrew v. State, 233 S.E.2d 209 (Ga. 1977) (holding that mandatory insurance does
not violate an individual's rights).
224. See Michael L. Closen & Michael J. Osty, Illinois' Million-DollarNotary Bond Deception, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 2, 1995, at 6 (pointing out that about 30 states require
notaries to be bonded); Osty, supra note 216, at 845-846.
225. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.3 & cmt. 3.3.3 ("Financial responsibility may be assured through security arrangements such as surety bonds or
standby letters of credit, or perhaps through liability insurance .... "). Id. For further
discussion of certification authority liability, see MICHAEL S. BAUM, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION
AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND POLICY: LAw AND POLICY OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PUBLIC KEY AND

DIGITAL SIGNATURES (1994). See also Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 747-748 (sug-
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bond and insurance protection must be disclosed in each certification authority's repository, and that a certification authority may not verify a
document or instrument declaring a face value exceeding the bond or insurance coverage of the certification authority.
It has been argued that a notary acts as a fiduciary to those who use
the notary's services, although this viewpoint is not shared universally. 22 6 Yet, as noted earlier, the certification authority is generally not
considered a fiduciary to a subscriber 2 27 and must conform only to a
standard of ordinary care, 228 in spite of the fact that digital signature
legislation requires the certification authority to have higher qualifications, training and expertise than the notary, as well as greater responsibilities. 229 We believe that digital signature legislation must impose
substantial responsibilities on all of the parties to electronic transactions. Holders of private keys should have absolute liability for the use
(authorized or otherwise) of the private key. 230 Recipients of electronic
documents should be entitled to reasonably rely upon them only after
thorough review of both the certificate of authentication for the document and the repository information of the certification authority (including the CRL), and only to the extent of the financial responsibility for
which the certification authority is accountable. 2 3 1 The certification authority must be declared to be a fiduciary of all of its electronic commerce
clients, senders and recipients alike, 23 2 thus, imposing a higher set of
gesting that the financial accountability of certification authorities be thoroughly considered and that legislation establish substantial bond and/or insurance requirements for
them).
226. Closen, supra note 61, at 662-65.
227. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 2.4 ("A certification authority is a
fiduciary to a subscriber where a certification authority holds that subscriber's key or
where provided by contract. A certification is not otherwise a fiduciary to a subscriber and
is not a fiduciary to any relying party, except where provided by contract or by law"). Digital Signature Guidelines, supranote 95 § 2.4, cmt. 2.4.1 further provides that "[a] certification authority typically provides services at arm's length and does not create a special
relationship with its subscribers or relying parties, such as a fiduciary relationship." Id.
228. See id. cmt. 2.3.4 ("A certification authority is charged with treating its subscribers
and others with ordinary care . . ").
229. See also DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1.6, cmt. 1.6.3 (Stating that

a Cybernotary must posses "technical expertise to facilitate computer-based transactions
requiring a high level of certification . .. .") Id.
230. But see Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 4.3 cmt. 4.3.2 ('This Guide-

line is intentionally silent about the precise standard of care applicable to a subscriber's
duty not to divulge the private key.").
231. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 5.4 (discussing factors that may

lead to reasonable reliance upon a certificate).
232. But see Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 2.4 ("A certification author-

ity is a fiduciary to a subscriber where a certification authority holds that subscriber's private key or where provided by contract. A certification authority is not otherwise a
fiduciary to a subscriber [or a] relying party, except where provided by contract or by law.")
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duties than the ordinary duty of reasonable care. This issue is particularly critical when one considers the enormous volume of substantial
commercial transactions that are conducted over the Internet on a daily
basis, and that this volume will continue to rise at a rate that is truly
2 33
inestimable.
Only a handful of states require criminal background checks before
a notary may be commissioned. 2 34 In contrast, the Latin Notariate must
have "good moral character," and a criminal record free of dishonorable
acts. 2 35 The Washington Digital Signature Statute for certification authorities also sets forth very strict guidelines in this respect. 23 6 It requires firms serving as certification authorities to refrain from
employing any person convicted of a felony in the past fifteen years, and
restricts certification authorities from employing anyone ever convicted
of a crime involving fraud, false statement, or deception. 23 7 The Act further requires that certification authorities only employ persons with a
demonstrated knowledge of the Act's provisions. 238 Utah's Digital Signature Act has similar background provisions and goes further, eliminating the "past fifteen years" language, thereby, prohibiting certification
authorities from employing anyone convicted of a felony or crime involv23 9
ing fraud, false statement or deception.
The most critical part of the certification authority's task is to verify
the identity of the parties to the transaction. Washington's Act requires
certification authorities to confirm that: (1) the subscriber is indeed the
person listed in the certificate to be issued or a duly authorized agent; (2)
the information in the certificate is accurate; (3) the prospective subId; see also cmt. 2.4.1 ("A certification authority typically provides services at arm's length
and does not create a special trusted relationship with its subscribers or relying parties,
such as a fiduciary relationship.") Id. But see cmt. 2.4.3 ("The commercial marketplace and
usage of trade will ultimately determine the extent of any demand for "fiduciary-like" certification services.") Id.
233. See supra notes 9-10 and 14-15 and accompanying text, and infra note 254.
234. Henderson & Kovach, supra note 196, at 865. Only Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New York require law enforcement officials to perform such
procedures. Id.
235. Pedro A. Malavet, The ForeignNotarialLegal Services Monopoly: Why Should We
Care?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV 945, 964 (1998).
236. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.100 (Supp. 1998). By comparison, Washington's notary qualifications are fairly lenient, requiring only that a notary be at least eighteen years old, read and write English, and either reside, work or do business in the state.
Id. § 42.44.020.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 (Supp. 1996). By comparison, Utah's notary statute
requires only that a notary be at least eighteen years old, a resident of the state for thirty
days, able to read, write and understand English, and a statement of personal information.
Id. § 46-1-3.
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scriber holds the appropriate corresponding private key; and (4) the certificate contains sufficient information to locate a repository in case the
certificate is suspended or revoked. 2 40 Both the Washington and Utah
statutes provide that by issuing certificates, certification authorities
warrant that the certificates contain no information known to be false,
were issued within the certification authority's authority, and satisfy the
other requirements of each respective act.2 4 1 Sadly, like most notary
statutes, neither state provides specific guidelines for identifying the
parties to a reasonable degree. 2 4 2 While identification guidelines in digital signature legislation are lacking, current laws require a fairly comprehensive record keeping system. 24 3 The A.B.A. Digital Signature
Guidelines require that a certification authority "document all facts material to the issuance, suspension, or revocation by it of a certificate, and
retain that documentation for an appropriate time."24 4 The comments to
this section suggest that records "could include" information relating to
the parties' identification, but unfortunately make no specific requirement. 24 5 In contrast, notarial acts performed in civil jurisdictions are
officially considered public documents, regardless of whether they are of
a public or private nature. 24 6 Several states even require that ordinary
notaries public maintain a notary log or journal that must include several items of information such as the name and address of the document
signer, the signature of the document signer, and the method of identifying the document signer (with supporting detail). 24 7 California also requires the document signer to place his/her right thumbprint in the
240. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.210 (Supp. 1998). This provision also prohibits
waiver of these requirements by either party. See id.
241. See id. § 19.34.220 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-303 (Supp. 1996). These provisions
also prohibit waiver of these requirements by either party.
242. Most states do not provide specific guidelines for identifying parties. However, a
few states require that the notary maintain a journal that identifies each notarization. See,
e.g., CAL. GOVT § 8206 (West 1992) (requiring notary to record date, time and type of each
notarization, character of the document notarized, the signature and manner of identification of each party, and a fingerprint where the notarization involves transfers of land interests). For further discussion of the favorability of thumbprinting, see Thumbprinting:"The
Notary's Best Anti-Fraud Weapon," NOTARY BULL., June 1995, at 1, 13.

243. Similarly, states may require notaries to keep such records. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 46-1-15 (stating that if a notary keeps a journal record, it must be safeguarded as a valuable public document and kept in the exclusive custody of the notary).
244. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.5.
245. Id. at cmt. 3.5.1.
246. Malavet, supra note 235, at 955 & n.39, (citing France (C. Crv., ARTs. 1317, 1319;
ORDINANCE No. 45-2590 of 2.11.1945, ART 1; LAw OF 25 VENTOSE YEAR XI, ART. 19));
Belgium (Civ. CODE ARTS. 1317, 1319; LAW OF 25 VENTOSE YEAR XI, ARTs. 1, 19); Italy (C.c.
ARTs. 2699, 2700; NOTARIAL LAw (1913), ART. 1); Spain (C.C. ARTS. 1216, 1218; CIV. PROCEDURE LAW, ART. 596; NOTARIAL LAw (1862), ART. 1; NOTARIAL REGULATIONS (1944), ARTS. 1,
2); Germany (ZPO, ARTS. 415(1), 418(1), 437, NOTARIAL ORDINANCE (1961), ART. 1).

247. Van Alstyne, supra note 72, at 778 & n.5.
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24
notary journal for certain real estate documents. 8
Market forces alone may not be enough to assure that only a small
number of well-qualified entities (and the people behind them) become
licensed as certification authorities. State legislation should strictly regulate the number of entities offering certification authority services,
while reserving the "root certification authority" for a government entity,
such as the Secretary of State. 24 9 Limitations on the number of licensed
certification authorities may be based on the total population, or on the
volume of business transactions conducted. But, we urge that governments err on the side of too few licenses, for the numbers can always be
increased as commercial need warrants. Alternatively, similar federal
statutes and regulations may be more appropriate to ensure that the certification authority's role in electronic commerce will receive the paramount and uniform national attention that it deserves. 2 50 Under this
scheme, an agency such as the Federal Trade Commission might serve
as the "root authority," allowing individual state secretaries of state to
serve as a secondary root authority. Increased uniformity of practice
within the United States along with its encouragement of growth of electronic business would be among the important advantages to be gained
from these legislative steps. 25 1 These steps would also help ensure that

248. Gnoffo, supra note 42, at 805 & n.19 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8206(a)(7)) (West
1992 & Supp. 1996).
249. See Closen & Richards, supra note 195, at A19 (observing that certification authorities "will necessarily possess significant economic power, and that is an unsettling prospect, given the historic underqualification of notaries in this county;") See also supra notes
139-143 and accompanying text.
250. See Hill, supra note 4, at 12 ("Congress has not yet enacted any federal law governing digital signatures and electronic commerce, although the banking lobbyists have
been anxious to have it do so."); Newcombe, supra note 58, at 44 ("Fearing a litany of state
laws may stifle electronic commerce, a number of firms and business groups have pressured Congress to establish sweeping national laws governing electronic authenticationan important tool for safe and secure transactions on the Internet.") Id.
251. See Newcombe, supra note 58, at 44. ("[S]oftware firms that make authentication
tools and the firms that would use them made it clear they believed states are moving too
slowly on the issue of legalizing electronic authentication and are producing legislation
loaded with conflicting regulations that might prove too burdensome for electronic commerce to flourish.") Id; ("There is concern that nonuniform state laws may have a negative
effect on the development of electronic banking and commerce.") Hill, supra note 4, at 12;
("Ideally, Congress should address [heightened standards for certification authorities] as a
national issue, but the current states' rights climate and the traditional lack of federal
interest in notaries makes this unlikely, so the matter rests with the states.") Closen &
Richards, supra note 195, at A19. However, there is also a point of view favoring state
regulation of electronic commerce. Newcombe, supra note 58, at 44.
In explaining why it favors a state-led approach to developing digital signature
policies and standards, the American Bar Association pointed out that premature
legislation at the national level 'runs the risk of stunting the natural evolution of
market forces that will produce the most cost-efficient, user-friendly, interoperable
and effective implementation of digital signatures. While early adopters of digital
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electronic documents authenticated by American companies will be acceptable to foreign business people, unlike some of the paper documents
2 52
authenticated by American notaries public.
V.

CONCLUSION

"There 2is
no reason for any individual to have a computer in their
53
home."
Ken Olson, President, Chairman, and founder of Digital
Equipment Corp., 1977.
"The numbers are already staggering, but they'll explode over the next
five years-28.7 million computer users in the United States in 1998,
45.3 million by the millennium and a mind-boggling 77.6 million by the
"

year 2002., 254

Janet Key, for the American Bar Association Journal, 1998.
The United States Treasury Department's Office of the Comptroller
of Currency recently declared a certification authority to be the "functional equivalent" of a notary. 2 5 5 The authors are quite bothered by comparisons of that kind. It is probably more accurate to say that a
certification authority or cybernotary resembles an enhanced or "hybrid"
signature technology desire greater national uniformity in the immediate future,
the overall interests of evolving the best public-key infrastructure requires a period of experimentation.
Id.
252. Closen & Richards, supra note 195. "Since notaries are esteemed in many other
countries and used regularly by business professionals, [the] debasement of the office [of
notary public] in America is likely to become a problem for international [electronic] commerce, particularly as more and more arrangements and agreements are made in cyberspace." Id. "Itis becoming increasingly important to have reliable, reputable certification
authorities that are recognized worldwide, in order to ensure secure global transactions
like those used in international banking." Hill, supra note 4, at 11. See supra, notes 190213 and supporting text for further discussion of the lack of respect given to American
notaries and the documents they notarize.
253. Closen, supra note 195.
254. Janet Key, Spin Your Own Web, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1998, at 76; see also Internet TrafficBooming, DAILY SOUTHTOWN [API, Apr. 16, 1998, at 1 ("Traffic on the Internet is doubling every 100 days, the government said Wednesday in the latest snapshot of the
exploding information technology industry.") Id.
255. See letter from Julie C. Williams, Chief Counsel, Controller of the Currency, Administrator of Banks, to Stanley F. Farrar, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell, Jan. 12, 1998 (visited August 19, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98-4att.pdf>. See also Philip S.
Corwin, Notaries in Cyberspace:A New Role for Banks, AM. BANKER, Feb. 10, 1998, at 4,
available in 1998 WL 4880265 (discussing Office of Comptroller's determination that Certification Authorities are the functional equivalent of a notary, and, therefore, allowed a national bank to establish a certification authority service); see also Digital Signature
Guidelines, supra note 95, § 1.6, cmt. 1.6.3 (determining that the Cybernotary's function
mirrors that of a notary).
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notary. 25 6 While serving the same document signer identification function as notaries, certification authorities also verify the integrity of the
257
substance of the documents to which the parties bind themselves.
That constitutes an enormously important distinction between the two
posts. Moreover, both the potential volume and magnitude of transactions with which certification authorities will be called upon to deal
greatly distinguish the post from the relatively insignificant notary public. The estimates revealed in Janet Key's statement (as quoted just
above 2 58 ) confirm our point. Unfortunately, due to the trivialized nature
of the traditional notary public, the certification authority may face a
similar fate.
The "staggering" growth predicted will not be without its complications. Some claim that digital signatures verified by certification authorities are impregnable. "It is mathematically impossible to forge someone
else's digital signature." 25 9 But, others caution that "no security scheme
is 100% unbreakable." 2 60 Indeed, inherent in such fast-paced expansion
26 1
of technology is the risk of mistakes, abuses, and frauds occurring.
Every system is subject to the factor of human involvement. And,
human error, including flawed judgment, is an ever-present prospect.
First of all, the private key can assure secure communication only if it is
kept truly private by the people who control it. In October of 1998,
LEXIs-NExis dispatched an "Urgent Security Notice" to law schools warn256. CertificationAuthoritiesAdd Another Layer of Security, HEALTH DATA MGMr., Sept.
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8747997. "A certification authority is similar to a notary
public, only more complete." Id.
257. Elliott, supra note 65, at 915.
258. Key, supra note 254, at 76.
259. Klau, supra note 6, at 14.
260. See internet site <http://www.internic.net/faq/guardian.html>.
261. Regarding the possibility of serious mistakes occurring, many computer software
programs seem to be plagued by glitches or bugs. See, e.g., Becky Beaupre, Computer
Glitch at 24 LibrariesIs One for the Books, CHI. SuN-TIES, May 6, 1998, at 34 (reporting
that 24 suburban libraries encountered a computer glitch lasting eight days and denying
the libraries the ability to determine whether books were checked out without physically
going to the shelves); Computer Glitch Gives Retirees Extra Social Security Interest, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 22, 1998, Section 1 at 25 (reporting that a "computer glitch has resulted
in Social Security's reserve account earning higher interest than it should," the total
amount estimated to be about $4.4 billion). Of course, the major problem that just about
everyone seems to be talking about is the Y2K millennium bug. There have been countless
articles addressing this concern. See, e.g., Howard Wolinsky, Y2K Glitch Could Rear Its
Head This Week, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at 1 (discussing the prospect that serious
Y2K problems could really begin at various times in 1999); Robert G. Gerber, Comment,
Computers and the Year 2000: Are You Ready?, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837 (1997) (discussing the significance of the Y2K problem, and the issue of who ought to bear the cost for
Y2K-compliance). With respect to the role of notaries in dealing with Y2K problems, see
David S. Thun, Following the Paper Trail:Notaries and the Y2K Crisis,NAT'L NOTARY, Jan.
1999, at 18.
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ing of an e-mail scam in which impostors purporting to act for LEXISNEXIS, "under various pretenses," requested customers to provide their
LEXIs-NExIS passwords or identifiers. 2 62 According to the security flyer
and cover letter, some customers were duped into supplying their codes
to the impostors. 2 63 Some law enforcement agencies have begun placing
criminal "wanted" listings on-line. 26 4 Imagine the chaos and injury that
could result from such listings being accessed and tampered with by an
unauthorized high-tech hacker or intruder. There is also concern about
the confidentiality of the contents of electronic communications, but
sometimes the holders of information and the senders of messages simply do not take enough security steps to protect against unwanted
2 65
disclosures.
One consequence of the arrival of the information era is that just
about everything seems to have been made available on computer
266
databases-academic, financial, criminal, medical, and other records.
And, much of this information is quite sensitive and should be kept confidential. Secondly, the certification process can assure secure communication only if the people who control it remain untouched by the
temptations of collusion and corruption. There is no reason to expect
that the people who serve as certification authorities will rise above the
same kinds of misconduct that have been committed by private individuals and public officers at every level. 26 7 Rigorous credentialing of certification authorities must be mandated. Otherwise, even if diamond
262. See Letter, from LEXIS-NEXIS, to Law School Faculty & Staff, Oct. 29, 1998 (relating to "E-mail and Telephone Scam,") with "URGENT SECURITY NOTICE" attachment
("A scam is currently being perpetrated upon a few LEXIS-NEXIS customers by both email and telephone. This scam asks the customer to provide their LEXIS-NEXIS ID (code)
to a generic e-mail box or over the phone.") Id. Copies of both the letter and attachment
are on file with the authors.
263. Id. The attachment directed customers to report to their account representative
"if you have been contacted and/or have already provided your LEXIS-NEXIS ID.... .". The
letter also suggested that some customers may have been "contacted and provided ID information" to the scam artists. Id.
264. See Wanted: Listings on Web, THE STAR [newspaper], Nov. 5, 1998, at B3 (reporting
that police in Lincoln, Nebraska, have published "more than 6000 names of people who
have outstanding warrants" on the Internet). See also <http-//interlinc.ci.lincoln.ne.us>.
265. "In the pursuit of quick access to medical records, [on-line] systems are being built
without any thought to privacy." Deidra Mulligan, Staff Counsel to the Center for Democracy and Technology, quoted in Medical Records On-line ForAll To See?, TRIAL, Dec. 1998,
at 12.
266. For further discussion of medical records on-line and issues of confidentiality and
security, see Robert O'Harrow Jr., Plans'Access to Pharmacy Data Raises Privacy Issue,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at Al; see also Milt Fruedenheim, Medicine at the Click of a
Mouse: On-line Health FilesAre Convenient. Are They Private?,N.Y. TmsS, Aug. 12, 1998,
at D1.
267. For instance, "[niotary-related dishonesty appears to be on the rise." Closen, supra
note 59, at A23.
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dealers Carroll and Jean employed the services of a certification authority for their transaction, 268 there would be less assurance that fraud
could be avoided.
Certification authorities will be asked to fill a critical role as the
gatekeepers of secure communications and transactions in the information age, but their futures are at risk. Yet, at the same time, their futures could become very bright. We have the truly rare opportunity for
business and legal policy to move ahead almost simultaneously with
technology as it relates to the functioning of the certification authority in
electronic commerce. Admittedly, developing legal and policy guidelines
for technology while in its infant stages is "somewhat like trying to board
a moving bus,"269 but it must be attempted. If we delay, we will be far
too late. Once the bus has left, its path will become fixed-impossible to
undue the ground that has already been covered and increasingly difficult to modify even as to its more distant route ahead. Now is the only
time when heightened standards for the appointment and conduct of certification authorities can effectively be implemented. Perhaps the bus
has not quite left yet. As one commentator has suggested, "Digital signatures are still a solution in search of a problem ....
People don't know
what to do with [them] yet."27 0

268. See the hypothetical illustration that introduced this paper, supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text.
269. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d. Cir. 1997). "It would be
easier to lasso Jell-O than to apply traditional regulatory structures to the Internet."
Pearce, supra note 11, at 14, quoting Susan Ness.
270. Newcombe, supra note 58, at 44 (quoting Todd Sander, Deputy Director of the
Washington State Department of Information Services.) Although online commerce is
growing dramatically, the use of digital signature technology has not taken root so firmly
yet. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley commented that "the digital economy is alive
and well and growing." Internet Traffic Booming, DAILY SOUTHTOWN [API, Apr. 4, 1998, at
1. "The information technology industry is growing as fast as the overall economy." Id. at
2. However, "[ailmost no cybernotaries have been appointed or have yet begun to function."
Closen & Richards, supra note 4, at 715. Although Utah in 1995 became the first state to
adopt digital signature and certification authority legislation, it has just begun to register
certification authorities. See First 'CertificationAuthorities' May Register Electronic Notaries, NoTARY BuLL., Feb. 1999, at 9.
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